Local Environmental Regulation in Post-Socialism: A Hungarian Case Study by Chris G. Pickvance

Local Environmental Regulation in Post-Socialism: A Hungarian Case Study by Chris G. Pickvance

Author:Chris G. Pickvance [Pickvance, Chris G.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138715936
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2019-11-11T00:00:00+00:00


An interviewee noted that:

This is a very convenient situation as far as Chinoin is concerned because the fines for letting its sewage into the drainage system are much lower than for letting [it] direct into the fresh water. They would be charged much more for that. Therefore it was worthwhile for [Chinoin] to build a 20 metre long drain pipe. But through this the sewage gets into the fresh water nevertheless. (H 39)

The reason for this is that according to the division of labour between authorities, the Drainage Authority fines Chinoin for polluting its sewer, and the REI fines the Drainage Authority for allowing the sewer to pollute the fresh water.

The same interviewee noted that Chinoin had been promising to build a sewage treatment plant for 15 years but had benefited from the provision for 'progressive exemption'. This applies if a firm has plans to resolve a problem or is making technical modifications to improve the quality of the effluent. It explains why having good intentions has an economic value.

The other issue associated with Chinoin was its containers for storing chemicals and fuel oil. These were of different ages and conditions 'and are only partly equipped with some kind of technical protection.' (H 36) They required REI permission to ensure they were safe and that there was no leakage into the soil. The REI gave this permission provided the firm set up a monitoring system. (According to an REI official, in fact they had a partial system but 'they didn't use it... as often as we would like them to. We had no knowledge of them taking regular samples from the water and examining it'. (H 36))

Lastly one REI interviewee reported on the REI's practice regarding fines:

because I work with many other companies as well I can see that they [Chinoin] try to follow these rules [ISO 14000] ... At the same time we also know that they have a problem which they try to solve from inside. Because if the authorities [the REI] learn about it, they'll levy fines. Therefore I think that we should make a distinction between the facts that, on the one hand, they [Chinoin] do try to fulfill the highest standards, but on the other hand they don't want to involve the authorities when they have a smaller problem, especially if they can solve it themselves. But we don't always levy fines. If they can solve the problem immediately or start to do something about it, then we don't levy fines. It's not at all sure that all the cases reach us as an official case. On many occasions we only hear about them and if we see that there is an attempt to remedy the situation then we don't make it into a case.' (H 37)

This again makes clear the discretion which the REI applies in dealing with firms. Also when fines are applied there is scope for variation according to circumstances: from 10% to 150% of the basic fine which is applicable. (Compare Chapter 3, where a ratio of 50% to 500% was quoted, a 1:10 range instead of 1:15.



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