Iraq's Sunni Insurgency by Ahmed S. Hashim

Author:Ahmed S. Hashim [Hashim, Ahmed S.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Mathematics, Applied, Political Science, Security (National & International)
ISBN: 9780415466554
Google: vaXD-fMgEXMC
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2009-01-15T01:17:33+00:00

Chapter Five

The Insurgency’s Internal and External Problems

The insurgency in Iraq is largely Sunni Arab, despite the fact that Sunni Arabs only account for around 17% of the population. Partly as a result of this, the insurgency suffers from severe weaknesses. It has never been able to transcend the parochial and particularistic interests of Iraq’s various communities. Even when the country appeared to be on the verge of a genuine national uprising in 2004, when elements of the Shia population mobilised under the leadership of cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, the potential for unity was less than many hoped, despite the claims of some Iraqis that, at last, their country was reacting in a unified national way to the foreign presence.1 As became clear, al-Sadr was not rising in support of the Sunnis, nor was there any coordination with Sunni insurgent groups except at the very lowest tactical levels.

The insurgency’s lack of unity, reflected in the existence of myriad groups, has had a negative impact on mobilisation, organisational coherence, the promotion of an effective ideology of resistance and the articulation of goals to which all Iraqis could subscribe. Moreover, the insurgency has not succeeded in attracting effective international support, nor have its members been able to find sanctuary abroad.

Not a National War of Liberation

The insurgency in Iraq is not a national-liberation struggle in the traditional sense of a war against an occupying power. It may be perceived as such by much of the Sunni community, but the insurgency has failed to move beyond its ideological parochialism to incorporate other Iraqis. Indeed, it has contributed, along with other elements in the country, to sectarian divisions and thus to national disunity. There is extensive active and passive support for the insurgency within the Sunni Arab community, support which has increased since the emergence of the Shi’ites as the major political force in the country2 – though it is important to remember that not all Sunnis have taken up arms, and many are involved peaceably in the political process.

None of Iraq’s other ethno-sectarian communities is as heavily involved in the insurgency. Sunni Kurds make up around 18% of the country’s population and Shia Arabs constitute roughly 60%. The remaining 6% comprises Turkmen, Christians and other groups. These figures are vigorously disputed, particularly by Sunni Arabs and Turkmen, many of whom are convinced that Shi’ite numbers are inflated. Sunnis often complain that the Coalition exaggerates the demographic weight of the Shi’ites for political reasons, and many Sunni Arabs claim that they constitute a majority, sometimes boosting their community’s numbers by including Kurds and Sunni Turkmen in their count. However, a supposed demographic superiority is not the Sunnis’ main argument for why they ought to have preponderant power. The claim that the Sunnis ‘built’ Iraq, and that the country therefore ‘belongs to’ them is a popular one in Sunni circles in Iraq.3

Very few Kurds have taken up arms in support of the insurgency. For the great majority of Kurds, the US invasion represented liberation from the ever-present threat posed to their region, autonomous since 1991, by Saddam’s regime.

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