China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Great Leap Forward, 1955-59: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Great Leap Forward, 1955-59 by Frederick C. Teiwes & Warren Sun

Author:Frederick C. Teiwes & Warren Sun [Teiwes, Frederick C. & Sun, Warren]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781315502809
Google: N4GTDAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 30852522
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1998-08-01T00:00:00+00:00

After Shanghai, April–June 1959: Greater Compromises and Continuing Unreality

The Chairman’s ill temper and inevitable hesitations among his colleagues notwithstanding, the Shanghai meetings did give a boost to efforts to introduce greater realism into CCP policy. Mao personally continued the effort on the rural front with an April 29 letter to rural cadres denouncing “mere bragging” and demanding that production targets be based on reality, an effort that allegedly further displeased the Chairman’s “left”-inclined colleagues at the provincial level.101 Meanwhile, the chastened Bo Yibo and Li Fuchun at least had a clearer direction as they convened a two-day conference of planners in mid-April. But undoubtedly the most significant development was the newly authoritative role of Chen Yun who “no one had listened to” in the months leading up to Shanghai. Now Chen had the benefit of Mao’s clear and repeated statements at the meetings that his (Chen’s) cautious views during the winter had been correct, and he began to influence policy. At Shanghai he acted on the request of Hunan’s Zhou Xiaozhou who even after the second Zhengzhou conference had been on the radical side of rural policy but now wanted Chen to approach Mao about reducing the density of planting, an approach the Chairman had been identified with. Chen agreed with Zhou Xiaozhou’s view, discussed the matter with agricultural czar Tan Zhenlin, and wrote Mao accordingly — with the result that the recommendation was endorsed in the Chairman’s April 29 letter. But clearly the most significant indication of his growing importance was that, sometime after the conclusion of the plenum, Mao entrusted Chen with investigating the increasingly serious situation concerning steel production.102

While the story of Chen’s involvement in, and the general process of the revision of steel targets, has long been known,103 greater detail is now available which allows a more refined analysis of the politics of the situation. Chen’s efforts came against a background where three views had been expressed on targets at Shanghai. One view, that of a “small group,” felt that since the Wuhan targets for 1959 had been publicized, it was necessary to strive to achieve those targets. A second opinion held by “most” at the time was that these targets could hardly be achieved and if they were pursued at any cost great political and economic costs would result, and this apparently led to the 16.5 million internal steel target. Finally, a “minority” believed that even the low 16.5 million target could not be accomplished and should be revised further.104 What is striking in the events following Shanghai is not only the sharp drop in the steel target and Chen Yun’s critical role in pushing the project forward, but also the seemingly widespread central bureaucratic support for the move. This can be seen in Table 3 (p. 156) which indicates the proposals of various actors.105

Following the Shanghai plenum the SPC became involved in the steel question with Vice Chairman Jia Tuofu, the “rightist” of the planning leaders in Mao’s early 1958 assessment, calling in various officials to check the actual steel output for 1958.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.