China, Taiwan and the Offshore Islands by Thomas E Stolper

Author:Thomas E Stolper [Stolper, Thomas E]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, World, Asian, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781315495323
Google: XmtQDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 36809708
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2017-09-29T00:00:00+00:00

C. The Contradictory Fears of America’s Allies

From the American point of view, one of the most serious aspects of the 1954-55 Taiwan affair was that it threatened a split with nearly all of America's allies.60 Their reactions placed the United States in what Dulles called "a horrible dilemma": retreat or go to war alone.61

The European allies feared that they might be dragged into a war started in defense of Quemoy and Matsu.62 The fears of those allies weighed heavily with Eisenhower, and the National Security Council formally recognized that there were limits to America's ability to place pressure on the Asian Communist lands without "divisive effects on the basic United States-led coalition."63 This certainly applied to pressure on the PRC. Judging from his letters to Churchill, Eisenhower was particularly worried about the British reaction.64 Churchill wanted the offshores abandoned and said that Britain would not help defend them.65

However, Washington feared that abandoning the offshores would gravely damage its credibility in Asia. The United States could not refuse to defend the vital interests of an ally, as that ally defined them, unless the ally's definition could quickly be shown to be wrong. This accounts in part for Washington's belief that it could not abandon the offshore islands while Peking maintained its threat against Taiwan.

Eisenhower felt that if the United States put pressure on Chiang to retreat, many Asians would conclude that they had better make the best deal they could with the Communists.66 In mid-February, 1955, Dulles said that fear of Communist expansion and doubt about American determination to withstand it had already reached a danger point and implied that further retreat was inadvisable.67 His trip to Asia at the end of February and the beginning of March strengthened this impression. He returned convinced that the war of nerves between the United States and the PRC was being closely watched everywhere he went.68

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