Wittgenstein and Value by Litwack Eric B.;

Author:Litwack, Eric B.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
Published: 2009-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

In summary, although genetic or evolutionary factors may predispose human beings towards some general sources of pleasure, success and security, it is difficult to see how they alone can explain the remarkable variation and complexity of judgements of aesthetic value in all of their cultural, and personal manifestations. For this, we must focus rather on the place that our particular artistic practices play in human life, not just within, but between cultures. In this endeavour, Wittgenstein’s elucidatory philosophy retains some real value, allowing for some of the limitations indicated in this chapter.24

Wittgenstein is correct to deny this revisionary and counter-intuitive claim by pointing out that the meaning of aesthetic words, like all words, is to be grasped through a mastery of their use, in the manifold language-games of which they form a key part. Causal explanations, although of legitimate interest to neuroscientists and psychologists, should not be seen as a replacement for a sensitive understanding of human practices.25

Moreover, it is not clear what motive a scientistic philosopher or scientist would have for making such a move, other than to deny any real depth and importance to our real aesthetic practices in the interests of a particular theory or ideology. I would not wish to deny any use for causal explanations within social and biological science, where they are of obvious value. They may also be of limited value in explaining aspects of human behaviour, although they cannot explain away the meaning of our actual practices, as we see and live them. Having said this, Wittgenstein is at least correct, in claiming that a philosophy of the arts must focus rather on the real world of sociolinguistic practices in its attempt to understand this key set of practices.

It is these social practices, and their linked primitive reactions and language-games that are the true basis of artistic evaluations, which might be held to be refinements of them. Evaluative practices that come to mind in this regard include art auctions, appraisals, literary criticism and advanced music appreciation. Examples of more primitive language-games would include ranking, distinguishing written passages and attempting to describe the immediate effects of a musical score, respectively.

However, it is important to note that at points, Wittgenstein seems to make the excessively radical move of denying any major significance to verbal usage at all, focusing rather narrowly on human action within appropriate contexts. To return to the tailor example, in describing the self-evaluations of a tailor cutting a suit, he states that ‘… the tailor does not say: “This is nice.” He is a good cutter. He is just contented.’ Language-games such as praising, in this case, are held to be generally unnecessary and ultimately an outgrowth or refinement of more basic behaviour patterns.26

It is certainly true that language is not always a factor in our aesthetic evaluations. If I must choose between two sculptures, on artistic grounds alone, then my preference for the one over the other is displayed in my choosing. My action displays both a higher evaluation for the artefact chosen and, conversely, a lower one for the one rejected.

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