Social Theory and Social Practice by Hans L. Zetterberg

Author:Hans L. Zetterberg [Zetterberg, Hans L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Sociology, General
ISBN: 9781351306188
Google: jpRXDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2018-04-24T05:16:29+00:00

On Compliance with and Deviance from Prescriptions

The desire to maintain favorable evaluations by our associates is the key to our compliance with prescriptions. Some central ideas about compliance and deviation are expressed in this twofold proposition:

The more a person visibly deviates from a prescription given by his associates, the more unfavorable evaluations the latter tend to give him; and this tendency to evaluate him unfavorably is proportionate to the degree to which their own reception of favorable evaluations depends on his compliance with the prescription.35

In other words, we enforce our prescriptions by applying sanctions in the form of evaluations to those who violate them, and we are more apt to enforce prescriptions that satisfy us and less apt to enforce those that dissatisfy us.

The proposition makes clear that the motivation to obey prescriptions is always present, since those who deviate are given the unfavorable evaluation which our central motivational assumption asserts that they tend to avoid. Again it is interesting to note that persons who have an achievement motivation will tend to conform, not merely to the prescriptions of their past and present associates, but will adopt actions in the present that may be approved by future mates. Several such instances of anticipatory compliance have been recorded in the literature.

Prescriptions are, of course, violated at times, but only under certain conditions already implied. First, if a prescription is not known to a person, there is no reason to expect that he will obey it. Stupidity, as well as isolation from sources of knowledge about what is expected, breeds deviation. Second, if the action prescribed is not visible to associates, sanctions obviously cannot be forthcoming. Thus, darkness and privacy also breed deviations. Third, if the deviating action is not attributable by the associates to anyone in particular, then sanctions will not be applied to the actor; hence, the less identifiable the actor, the greater the likelihood of violation. The marked deviations that occur in milling, anonymous crowds find their explanation here. Fourth, if a greater reward can be obtained from violating a prescription than from obeying it, the chance of violation increases. There is always a strong temptation to violate a prescription if the violater thereby obtains a higher rank or the prestige associated with a greater command of an institutional value (infra, p. 111). Also, if a person is subject to contradictory prescriptions (‘role conflict’), he is likely to disobey the one that leads to the lesser reward. Finally, and perhaps most interesting, violations occur when the would-be enforcers withhold sanctions because they gain nothing by applying them. Thus, those who are themselves frustrated by the prescription make poor enforcers. In any group with frustrating prescriptions, enforcement from outsiders becomes essential: It is impossible for the group to “police themselves” effectively.

It is customary to regard deviations as a social evil. However, a certain number of small pockets of deviant behavior and thought may be a useful resource in adapting to drastically changing conditions. If an organization, institutional realm or society

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.