Sino-Indian and Sino-South Korean Relations by Chari P. R.;Raghavan Vyjayanti;

Author:Chari, P. R.;Raghavan, Vyjayanti;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group
Published: 2015-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Pakistan's Disruptive Role

The Sino-Pak entente is of long duration; it blossomed after 1961 when Pakistan supported China's bid for UN membership. It strengthened in 1963 after Pakistan reached a boundary agreement that transferred a sizeable area in Kashmir, lying within India's claim line, to China. In 1965 China stepped into the breach caused by US cessation of conventional arms transfers to Pakistan during the Indo-Pak war in that year. China also warned India against constructing some structures in Chinese territory as a diversionary measure, fuelling India's subsequent angst about having to face a two-front war. There are two ways of looking at China's support to Pakistan during the subsequent India — Pakistan conflicts and crises.

For one, China has not been remiss in providing verbal support to Pakistan in times of stress. During the almost year-long run up to the Indo-Pak war in 1971, China issued several warnings that it would ‘firmly support’ Pakistan's sovereignty. The anomaly then arose that these statements clearly contradicted China's basic policy of encouraging national liberation movements into which category the Mukti Bahini insurrection clearly fell. Despite Islamabad's fervent hope, however, that it would open a new front to relieve Pakistan's beleaguered troops in East Bengal (now Bangladesh) China did not get involved militarily. China also stayed neutral during the Kargil conflict; it was greatly embarrassed by Pakistan's feckless disregard of international norms in committing aggression across established borders. China, in fact, rejected a request by Pakistan for military support during the conflict, which forced Pakistan to withdraw its troops under US pressure. Again, China took no sides during the ten months-long Indo-Pak border confrontation crisis in 2001–02. China also stays neutral in regard to Pakistan's claims over Kashmir, considering it a bilateral issue for negotiation between India and Pakistan. How China will view Pakistan's aspirations to gain ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, by exploiting its links with the Taliban after the American withdrawal in 2014, would be of interest to India, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Central Asian Republics, apart from Russia and the US.

Several moderate academics in Pakistan have opined that the ascent of Nawaz Sharif and the PML(N) into power after the elections in 2013 may require relations with China and the US to be revisited. Specifically, Pakistan's relations with India need improve, despite the likely violent challenges from right wing parties. There is no dissent regarding Pakistan's all-weather friendship with China, but the latter has made clear that it will not provide much financial assistance. For this reason Pakistan cannot decrease its dependence on the US, despite occasional problems relating to drone attacks and Pakistan's continuing support to militant activities against India and Afghanistan that also lead to American casualties.38

38 Jinnah Institute, ‘Second Opinion: Pakistan's Foreign Policy Calibration’, https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?tab=wm#inbox/13f1047b42e056cf (accessed on 5 June 2013). On the other hand, China's transfer of missiles and missile production facilities has greatly augmented Pakistan's nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis India. Secret Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program has been widely chronicled, and includes design information on its fourth nuclear

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