Perspectives on Security and Strategic Stability by Sawyer Samp Lisa;Rathke Jeffrey;Bell Anthony; & Jeffrey Rathke & Anthony Bell

Author:Sawyer Samp, Lisa;Rathke, Jeffrey;Bell, Anthony; & Jeffrey Rathke & Anthony Bell
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781442279612
Publisher: Center for Strategic & International Studies
Published: 2016-10-08T00:00:00+00:00

SHIFTING TO CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Our dialogues in the region and in Washington took place between March and May 2016 amid a debate within NATO and the United States over the establishment of an enhanced, forward, allied troop presence on the eastern flank. In February 2016, NATO defense ministers agreed in principle to create an enhanced forward presence of multinational troops on the eastern flank to deter Russia. The details of the presence, however, remained unresolved and were being negotiated in the months before the Warsaw Summit in July 2016.4 Taking place as they did in the run-up to Warsaw, our discussions thus lend important insights into the final decision.

At the Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders announced their decision to deploy one NATO-flagged battalion per country to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, for a total of four.5 Each battalion (made up of approximately 800 to 1,000 troops) will be led by a framework nation, with the United States taking the lead in Poland, Germany in Lithuania, Canada in Latvia, and the United Kingdom in Estonia. While the framework nation will contribute the bulk of the forces, other NATO allies are also expected to contribute forces that will round out each battlegroup. As these NATO battalions are put in place, the rotational U.S. Army companies deployed to the Baltic States under OAR are likely to be consolidated and then rotate through the eastern flank to conduct training events and participate in exercises. U.S. training equipment that is currently prepositioned on the eastern flank will be gradually withdrawn to Western Europe and modified to become war-fighting stocks. With the outcome in mind, we can assess whether the outcome agreed at Warsaw met the expectations of eastern flank allies as expressed to our study team.

Our interactions with regional representatives highlighted a strong desire to see the United States and NATO shift toward a conventional deterrence posture on the eastern flank. Several experts we spoke with equated deterrence strategy with a stalwart forward defense of the Baltics. There was, however, a variety of opinions on the composition and strength of the forces that would be needed along the eastern flank to effectively deter Russia. As explained in Section 2, discussions in this regard tended to focus on the steps needed to deter Russian aggression in the form of a high-end conventional attack, with less emphasis on how to deter so-called hybrid threats. Observers’ remarks were therefore concentrated on the need for allied conventional forces and the related questions of force size, positioning, weapons systems and capabilities, rules of engagement, and other elements of combined military responses. There was significantly less emphasis on how to best deter low-end hybrid threats or whether a conventional deterrence strategy could be tailored to address the diverse set of threats facing the eastern flank.

Most participants tended toward ambiguity regarding the size of U.S. and allied forces they believed were needed to establish a credible deterrent. Instead of offering specifics, those we spoke with emphasized the need for a forward presence that was “sufficiently combat capable.

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