Foundations of Freedom by Clarke Simon R.;

Author:Clarke, Simon R.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Taylor & Francis Group

Conclusion

This and the previous chapter have shown us that autonomy as a conception of well-being fails to provide a robust case for individual freedom against paternalism. The previous chapter showed that although autonomy has value, that value is limited and qualified in such a way that does not rule out paternalism. In this chapter it was seen that the view that tries to show that autonomy is necessary in modern western societies exaggerates the difficulty of living a worthwhile, non-autonomous, paternalistically guided life in such societies.

The failure of the arguments for autonomy to support liberty may come as a surprise, but it should not do so. The reasons that often lead people to think that valuing autonomy is incompatible with restrictions of freedom are mistaken. Being forced into, say, a monotonous factory job for one’s entire life is both a bad life and a non-autonomous one. But it should not be concluded from this that a good life is impossible without autonomy or that autonomy always leads to a good life. Another widely held belief is the thought that paternalism threatens autonomy, which is an extremely important value. However, it does not follow (as I have tried to argue) that autonomy always has sufficient value to rule out paternalism. Autonomy may be valuable but it does not follow from this that its value trumps all others. Another motivation for belief in the incompatibility is the thought that unfreedom stunts the capacities required for autonomy. But again they need not. Paternalistic intervention, even if coercive, can block certain options from a person without damaging her abilities for rational self-direction. Finally, there is the thought that paternalism, perhaps because it assumes that another person knows my own good better than I do, must necessarily express a lack of respect for me as an autonomous agent. This, however, invokes a conception of autonomy different to the welfarist understanding of autonomy. As was seen in the previous chapter, to conceive of autonomy as a restraint on how someone may be treated, regardless of whether she may be made better or worse offby being so treated, differs from conceiving of autonomy as a value that improves the lives of those who have it. It is the latter understanding that has been the focus of these chapters. Once these points are grasped, and given the arguments in these two chapters, the conclusion is that individual freedom cannot be based on the value of autonomy as an ideal way of living.

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