Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Strains on Legitimacy by Mattei Dogan

Author:Mattei Dogan [Dogan, Mattei]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367006761
Google: KXXexgEACAAJ
Goodreads: 51220380
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-05-07T00:00:00+00:00

The Simulation Results to the Year 2000

The results displayed in five of the figures in this section were generated via a simple experiment. I took the estimated/calibrated models and simulated them until the year 2000. The exogenous inputs to the models are given by time series data for several socioeconomic indicators (see Widmaier 1982). The model begins with 1970 values, and until 1983 the exogenous time series data were used. From 1983 to 2000 I assumed that unemployment would rise in all five countries from the 1983 level to 20 percent, maybe too pessimistic a hypothesis. All other indicators (prices, income, etc.) remained constant on their 1983 value (see Figure 4.2 for an example).10

Each of the five country figures shows three lines: one for government popularity, a second for regime legitimacy, and a third (of less interest here) for polity support. In all five cases, government popularity follows a more or less regular pattern after 1983. Given the sharp rise in unemployment and the fact that the other indicators remain constant, all incumbent governments lose their reelection. My goal, however, is not to predict the change of governments until the year 2000 (which would be a rather ambitious undertaking) but to explore the impact on regime legitimacy if such a negative development would occur.

I am trying to avoid a general discussion about the comparative validity of the operationalizations. Doing so does not mean that I am not aware of the problems involved in comparing nations on the basis of such relatively simple indicators. I prefer, however, to look more at the implied dynamics of the model and take the data as given.

Looking at the simulation results for Italy (Figure 4.3), it is interesting to realize what stability means in a dynamic modeling context. In a comparative perspective the very low level of regime legitimacy (i.e., satisfaction with democratic procedures) must be alarming, and consequently Italy should be a country in which democracy is or will be shortly in trouble (see Kaase, Chapter 3). In a dynamic perspective (i.e., changes over time) Italy appears to be the most stable of all the five countries. In a sense this fact indicates that socioeconomic and political conditions no longer matter. Legitimacy can only be lost when it is there. But once it is lost, its lack does not cause a collapse of the system. It is even difficult to argue that the system will be more prone to collapse than other systems with higher levels of legitimacy. Unless the widespread dissatisfaction is organized and channeled (which might be quite difficult because of the existing political apathy and cynicism) little will happen. Rapid changes within short time periods are probably more damaging than a continuous low level of legitimacy. Still, I do not predict for Italy a stable political future independent of what the Italian economy does. I am just trying to make the point that in Italy certain factors do not matter that much. This situation is reflected in the model parameters and consequently leads to the result shown in Figure 4.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.