China's Lonely Revolution by Jeremy A. Murray

Author:Jeremy A. Murray [Murray, Jeremy A.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781438465326
Publisher: SUNY Press
Published: 2017-07-15T05:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER 6

HOLDING ALOFT HAINAN’S RED FLAG

Disobedience and Survival in the Civil War, 1946

In 1945, in the wake of the Japanese defeat and withdrawal, on the national scale, even during the halting negotiations between the Nationalists and the Communists, the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) “seemed, at this time, to be absolutely sure of victory through force.” There were some sticking points in the peace talks, however, and it was not certain that the Communists were ready or willing to make the concessions demanded of them by the Nationalists, and the Communist leadership seemed divided. Through the fall and winter of 1945–1946, the pantomime of peace brought hope to American observers and negotiators, including General George C. Marshall, who hoped to overcome the crucial step of joining all Chinese military bodies into a single national force. President Harry Truman declared the American position that would be Marshall’s marching orders as negotiator: “autonomous armies should be eliminated as such and all armed forces in China integrated effectively in the Chinese National Army.”1 American policy was officially to withhold assistance that would be used by the Nationalist government against the Communists in a civil war, but that did not preclude logistical aid and extensive cooperation. Noncombat military and intelligence missions were carried out in cooperation between the Nationalists and the Americans. The complex and ultimately doomed process proceeded but with few moments of satisfaction for any of the players.

On Hainan, Feng Baiju and the Communists entertained the possibility of again working with the Nationalists, but they had cause to extend little trust toward the group that had opposed national directives for unity, from the capture of Feng in 1937 to the continual skirmishes. The blame for some of these clashes after 1937 could be traced to both Nationalist and Communist forces, but the Communist leadership would later be persecuted by the mainland Communist regime for being too cozy with their Nationalist neighbors, and too eager to support the united front. The shifting alliance was difficult to track on the mainland where communications were largely free flowing, but on Hainan it was impossible for Feng to keep up-to-date on the shifting nuance of the united front. Now at the time of the Japanese defeat, the Hainan Communists were out of contact with the mainland Communist authorities in Yan’an, and for months thereafter, they were unable to safely establish radio contact with the mainland. When an Australian official asked Zhou Enlai, for example, in early 1946, about the possibility that missing Australian servicemen might have escaped Japanese prisoner of war camps on Hainan and joined with the Communists guerrillas, Zhou could not give him a definitive response. Zhou’s letter of May 14, 1946, is worth quoting in its entirety to reflect the CCP’s awareness, or lack of awareness, of the Hainan Communists at that time:

Dear Mr. [Patrick] Shaw:

Your letter of April 27th was received. We have immediately taken necessary steps to obtain the report on the Australian prisoners of war in Hainan Island. However,

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