Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature and Modern Skepticism by Colaner Nathan R.;

Author:Colaner, Nathan R.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780739177136
Publisher: Lexington Books/Fortress Academic
Published: 2015-08-29T00:00:00+00:00

Notes

1. See chapter 2, pp. 43-46.

2. I will do this even when quoting from the ROT, which usually translated nous as ‘thought.’

3. Charles Kahn, “Aristotle on Thinking,” 359.

4. Kahn, 360.

5. Kahn, 363.

6. See Deborah Modrak, “The Nous-Body Problem in Aristotle,” The Review of Metaphysics 44, no. 4 (June 1991): 755-774.

7. Kahn, 361-362

8. Although there are well-known contemporary attempts to resurrect substance dualism that attempt to avoid the problem of a bodiless substance.

9. Enrico Berti has these sorts of fears in mind when he recommends rejecting the translation ‘intuition’ and instead speaking of the intellection of indivisibles. Intuiting could imply no mediation by sense experience, or even that discursive thinking is unnecessary (Enrico Berti, “The Intellection of Indivisibles According to Aristotle, De Anima III 6,” in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, ed. G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 142). For a convincing attempt to resurrect the idea of intuition, see Victor Kal, Intuitive and Discursive Reasoning in Aristotle, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988).

10. See pp. 95-102.

11. This kind of defense is given often. See Michael Wedin, Aristotle’s Theory of Substance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

12. Sorabji, 242.

13. This interpretation is developed by G.E.L. Owen

14. This is why Aristotle says in Zeta 10 in regard to definitions of essences that truth is making contact and expressing them.

15. An. Post. 72a11, De int. 16b5-17a24.

16. De Int. 16b-17a24.

17. This is also Polansky’s interpretation, as he reconciles the passage at xx by appealing to Aristotle’s doctrine of non-assertive logoi in the DI.

18. See Granger for Aristotle’s shifting views on the role of the genus and differentia. Herbert Granger, “Aristotle on Genus and Differentia,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 22, no. 1 (1984): 1-23.

19. He gives this same example in the Meta. 1037b9-28

20. There seems to be a mistake in Reeve’s analysis of this passage. He says that “if ‘F is G’ is a definition, both F and G must, in the appropriate way be “one"—one intrinsic being. But because a definition is a perforce complex, there is a problem here: ‘that whose account we call a definition, why is it one? E.g., man is a two-footed animal—let this be the account. Why is this one and not many, animal and twofooted?’ (Met. VII 12 1037b 10-14.” (70). But it seems as though Aristotle’s issue here is how the G term itself could be unified, not how G could be united with the F term.

21. See Reeve, 70-79.

22. This is clear from An. Post. 1.1-4.

23. Ph. 194b 18-20, Meta. 1064a5, 1072b21, An. Post 71a7, 73a25, 74a7,76b37.

24. For instance, Irwin speaks this way. Irwin, pp. 134-136.

25. DA 417a22-417b8.

26. EN 1 140a2-3. Cf. An. Post. 100a8.

27. See pages 43-46.

28. Zeev Perelmuter, “Nous and Two Kinds of Epistēmē in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics,” Phronesis 55 (2010): 228-254.

29. Perelmuter, 250-1.

30. An. Post. 100b4.

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