Action Reconceptualized by Chan David K.;

Author:Chan, David K.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: undefined
Publisher: Lexington Books
Published: 2012-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Group 3: Features of Volition Found in Tryings

Prichard postulated volitions as the common character of all actions.[55] If every action is performed in the course of doing something intentionally, and intentional actions are what agents intend to do, then intention would be common to all actions. In chapter 1, I presented two theses that are relevant here.[56] One of these (Thesis 2) corresponds to the second of the two conditions for intention to be common to all actions. However, the first condition contradicts Thesis 1: We don’t always have to be doing something intentional when we act. This thesis rests on the existence of non-intentional actions, such as mannerisms and habitual actions, which are not done in the course of doing anything intentional.[57] Then something other than intention is needed to serve as the common character of all actions. Mannerisms and habitual actions, and any other candidate for non-intentional actions, are intuitively actions because, firstly, it is possible for someone to tell immediately without recourse to observation that he is acting. This would be true if he was trying to do what he did non-intentionally. Secondly, the movements made in acting non-intentionally are guided towards an object. This is not guidance involving the use of reason, but the kind of non-rational guidance involved in trying. It would seem that it is by trying that non-intentional actions are performed. Trying, unlike intention, could be the common character of all actions.[58]

Willing is the name that Prichard gave to the special kind of activity a person performs in acting.[59] When he moves his hand, his mental activity of willing allegedly causes the physical event that is the hand movement. Intending could not do this as it is a state of mind, not an activity. Forming an intention is a mental activity but this is not the activity we are concerned with when we think of a physical action of moving one’s hand. If Prichard had recognized the role of intention in a theory of action, he would have been able to see the need for something physical before an action is performed. It is not plausible to claim that by forming an intention, one has done all that needs to be done in order that what is intended is brought about. Unlike intending, trying is an activity that “goes beyond” intending. But it is also unlike willing in that it is manifested physically and does not just take place in the mind, which is an unpalatable aspect of Prichardian willings. It can be plausibly claimed that when one has tried, one has done everything that one has to do in order that one brings about the event that trying is aimed at. The activity needed to act does not terminate before physical events take place. In moving one’s hand, one’s activity of trying is manifested in nerve-firings and muscle contractions.

Trying also has features that it shares with both intention and willing. I need to show here that it is not at all strange to attribute these features to trying.

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