The Limits of Power by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Henry Holt and Company

War Without End

The Bush Doctrine represents the most momentous national security initiative since the inauguration of the Manhattan Project that built the first atomic bomb. Its implications far outstrip in importance the eponymous doctrines of Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, or Reagan.

Needless to say, in formulating this doctrine the Bush administration did not seek congressional assent. Nor did it even go through the motions of consulting the American people. A handful of Wise Men, led by Wolfowitz, saw a great opportunity to revolutionize national security policy. They wasted no time in exploiting that opportunity, selling the president on the merits of their idea and then implementing it, essentially by fiat.

The Bush Doctrine provided the ultimate rationale for invading Iraq. Wolfowitz and others in the administration were confident of achieving a quick, decisive victory. Indeed, the principal appeal of Iraq as a target was not that it was strong and fearsome; Gulf War I and a decade of sanctions had left Saddam Hussein with a decrepit army and essentially no air force. Iraq was inviting because it appeared so weak. An invasion promised to be a “cakewalk.” Wolfowitz and others in the administration were counting on victory, in turn, to validate the Bush Doctrine, demonstrating its efficacy and thereby paving the way for its further application. Simply put, with victory in Iraq, any last constraints on the employment of U.S. military power (and on the prerogatives of the imperial presidency) would fall away.

It is important to appreciate the scope of the plans that 9/11 set in motion. Our fixation on all that has since gone wrong in Iraq itself should not lead us to overlook the fact that eliminating Saddam was never the endgame. The invasion of Iraq formed only one element of a breathtakingly extravagant design. The Wise Men to whom President Bush turned for advice after 9/11 expected an easy win against a weak opponent to set the stage for far greater victories.

As early as 1997, Wolfowitz had argued that with Saddam’s removal “new options will open for U.S. policy.” New options implied alluring new opportunities to wield American power, thereby shaping the future in accordance with American interests. “Actions that are difficult or impossible now,” Wolfowitz had breezily predicted, “will become more feasible after we have taken the first steps.”48 Here lay the underlying intent of the Bush Doctrine: It provided a self-validating authorization for the administration to pursue whatever next steps it chose to take.

Although the next steps remained hidden from public view, they promised to be large. “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality,” a senior Bush administration official famously remarked to the journalist Ron Suskind. “We’re history’s actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.”49 The Bush Doctrine offered the principal vehicle for creating that reality. Relying on military power, the White House would act. Everyone else—the bureaucracy, the Congress, the American people, and the rest of the world—would be left to watch.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.