Film and the German Left in the Weimar Republic by Bruce Murray

Author:Bruce Murray
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: -
Publisher: University of Texas Press
Published: 2014-03-18T16:00:00+00:00

13

SOUND, THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, AND COMMERCIAL FILM’s IMAGES OF THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

Even before the economic crisis hit, the transition to sound dramatically affected the development of German cinema.1 In 1927 Ufa’s executives discussed the company’s contracts with the Triergon A.G. in Zürich (the inventors of the most advanced sound film system in Europe) and decided against further investments in sound film experimentation.2 Two years later, after unsuccessful attempts to find distributors for Ufa’s silent films in the United States, Ufa’s Ludwig Klitzsch returned to Germany and hurriedly began construction of a sound studio.3 In 1929 a few producers used sound as a novelty element in their films, but Ufa’s Die Melodie des Herzens (Melody of the Heart) was Germany’s first 100 percent sound film. Following its commercial success in December 1929, German film producers gradually acknowledged that silent films were a thing of the past.

Once again commercial cinema in Germany underwent a process of concentration. During the second half of 1928, the Tonbild-Syndikat A.G. (Tobis) emerged and claimed to possess the European licenses for sound film production.4 At approximately the same time, the two largest German electrical concerns, Siemens & Halske and A.E.G., founded the Klangfilm GmbH and made similar claims. Early in 1929, following an intense patent war, the two competitors agreed that Tobis would hold a monopoly in the realm of production; Klangfilm would control that of projection. Together Tobis and Klangfilm entered another round of competition with major U.S. patent holders over control of the world market. In July 1930 the participants decided to divide the world into spheres of influence, allowing Tobis and Klangfilm to control much of Europe.5

In the meantime, Tobis had established conditions for the production of sound films that virtually excluded all but the largest producers in Germany.6 Between 1929 and 1931, there were 71 production companies in Germany with a combined operating capital of near sixty-one million marks. The eight largest producers had a combined capital of fifty-eight million marks, or 95 percent of the total. Of these only Ufa, Emelka (which came under the indirect control of Ufa in 1929), and Tobis possessed licenses for sound film production. Tobis required the others to request permission to use its equipment. The company demanded extremely high prices for production rights and granted rights only to those producers whose scripts it deemed acceptable.7

The monopolistic control exerted by Tobis and Klangfilm greatly improved the positions of Ufa and a few other large producers. The rapid rise in the cost of production and the correspondingly great financial risk forced smaller companies to depend on commissions for production from larger companies, to limit production to between one and three films per year, and to concentrate on less costly and far less profitable silent films.8 As the return on silent film production dwindled, ever-increasing numbers of small producers went out of business.

The economic crisis only exacerbated the problem. Between 1929 and 1932 Germans allocated more of their income for basic needs and less for entertainment. Annual movie theater attendance sank steadily from, approximately, 328 million to 238 million.

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