Death to Tyrants! by David Teegarden

Author:David Teegarden [Teegarden, David]
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2013-03-06T05:00:00+00:00

Conclusion

The events analyzed in this chapter underscore the importance for pro-democrats to maintain their threat credibility. A dramatic, foundational “moment”—such as a public trial or oath against tyrants—certainly was essential: it established the initial credible commitment. But, due to the passage of time and changing circumstances, individuals may begin to doubt whether or not their fellow citizens remain committed. As a consequence, individual pro-democrats might lack the confidence to potentially risk their life in the defense of their democracy; thus they raise their revolutionary threshold. If anti-democrats detected that dynamic, they would conclude that the pro-democrats could not respond adequately to a coup. That is, they would conclude that the pro-democrats’ threat was not credible. Those anti-democrats would thus defect and try to establish a nondemocratic regime. To fight against that, pro-democrats had to continually generate common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend their democracy.

The need to maintain threat credibility would be particularly important for new democracies. The citizens of older, more established democracies benefit from the accumulated effect of past commitment demonstrations—by word or, most effectively, by deed. That is not to say that established democracies did not have to ensure that their threat remained credible. It is just that the regime likely would receive the benefit of the doubt: individuals, pro-democrats and anti-democrats alike, would more likely assume that the citizen population is defined by a “pro-mobilization” threshold sequence. Defending the democracy would thus be rational; staging a coup would be irrational. The citizens of new democracies, however, would not have such a reservoir of trust. They thus would readily doubt that their fellow citizens have maintained their commitment to defend the regime. In such an epistemic environment, it would be foolish for an individual to keep a low revolutionary threshold: he could not really be sure that, if he acted in defense of the democracy, a sufficient number of his fellow citizens would follow him. One would thus expect the citizens of new democracies to expend a considerable amount of energy to maintain common knowledge of widespread credible commitment to defend the democracy.

It is thus quite interesting to note that Alexander promoted anti-tyranny ideology during his conquest of—and attempt to democratize—the cities of western Asia Minor. This chapter analyzed one particular example, of course: it was Alexander himself who sent “the tyrants to the cities from which they came, to be treated as the citizens pleased” (Arr. Anab. 3.2.7). Those men almost certainly were sent back to their home poleis with some sort of written document that authorized and justified their execution specifically because they were “tyrants.” Alexander was thus sending a very clear message that “tyrants” are bad for the community and thus must be killed. And by brutally punishing them, the citizens of the various poleis would have internalized and normalized that anti-tyranny ideology.

Alexander also promoted anti-tyranny ideology in a proclamation he made after his victory in the battle of Gaugamela (331). According to Plutarch (Alex. 34), Alexander sought to increase his prestige among the Greeks.

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