The Six Day War by Guy Laron

Author:Guy Laron
Language: eng
Format: epub, mobi
ISBN: 9780300222708
Publisher: Yale University Press

16

SECRET LIAISONS

On the Importance of Unuttered Words

IN JUNE 1964, Eshkol came to Washington for a fateful visit. He was worried that Johnson would bring up the tricky subject of the reactor in Dimona and demand that Israel allow American inspectors to visit it regularly. Other than that, Eshkol was eager to get an American commitment to supply Israel with offensive weapons, preferably tanks.

He worried needlessly. With the US elections on the horizon, the president had other things on his mind. Before Eshkol met with Johnson, Averell Harriman, under secretary for political affairs at the State Department, took aside Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres, a member of the Israeli delegation, for a talk. Harriman spoke first: “I am a politician, you are a politician. Let’s talk as politicians do . . . I want you to know that President Johnson has an interest that Mr. Eshkol would continue to serve as Prime Minister. We believe that Mr. Eshkol is interested that Mr. Johnson would continue to serve [as president]. One can presume that Mr. Johnson will remain in office for another eight years.” Peres: “One can presume that Mr. Eshkol will remain in office for another five years.” Harriman: “You will have nothing to worry about during this time . . . Johnson’s special relation with you . . . is very clear. We have a few years ahead of us to do things together.” In the subsequent talks Johnson raised the nuclear issue and suggested that Israel should allow inspection, but he did not press it.1

It turned out that Harriman delivered a crucial clue about the way Johnson would handle things. The content of his talk with Peres was suggestive rather than indicative. A political deal was implied but was not spelled out. Johnson was facing elections in November 1964. Eshkol’s own elections were approaching in November 1965. Johnson needed Jewish votes to win. Eshkol needed the nuclear issue to be dormant. Rafi had already attacked him for allowing American inspectors one visit to the nuclear reactor at Dimona in December 1963. He did not want to relive the experience.2

Harriman’s emphasis on the assumption that it was in both leaders’ interests that the other would continue to serve in office seemed to allude to the political timetable. A bargain was implied: Jewish votes in exchange for quiet on the nuclear front. That was how Johnson did business with Israel. Words not uttered were more important than those that were.

In March 1965, for instance, negotiations between Israel and the US regarding a tank sale were approaching the home straight. Averell Harriman and Robert Komer came to Israel to iron out the final details. The State Department wanted to squeeze a string of concessions from Israel in return. One of them was that Israel should stop taking “premature preemptive action” against Syrian diversion works. State Department officials were convinced that Syria had neither the technical expertise nor the financial resources to follow up on its threats to implement the diversion project. The Israeli military, nevertheless, was adamant that it should take action.

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