The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics by C.J. Rowe;

Author:C.J. Rowe;
Language: eng
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Publisher: Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, LLC

1 A version of this chapter was presented as a paper at the Fifth Symposium Aristotelicum, held at Oosterbeek, Holland in August 1969, and has been published in the volume of Proceedings (Untersuchungen zur EE, ed. P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger, Berlin 1971).

2 There are exceptions (at 1096 b 24, 1098 b 24, 1153 a 21 and 1172 b 30). But in all these places Aristotle is explicitly discussing the views of others; and in VI he quite plainly distinguishes such uses of the term from his own.

3 EN 1139 a 8–10.

1 Op. cit., English translation, p. 239.

2 See p. 11 above. I shall later suggest, however, that it is a great deal closer to the truth than his critics have allowed.

3 I.e. at 1215 b 2, and 1216 a 11 ff.

4 It may in fact be used in more than two senses; at 1247 a 15 ff., for instance, the word tends to shade into the totally unphilosophical and ordinary meaning of ‘good sense’. But there is no real tension between this and the other senses, and I have therefore ignored it.

5 Op. cit.

6 F. Wehrli, ‘Ethik und Medizin. Zur Vorgeschichte der arist. Mesonlehre’, Mus. Helv. 8, 1951, p. 38, n. 11.

7 R. A. Gauthier, J. Y. Jolif, L’Ethique à Nicomaque, Louvain 1958, 1, p. 28*.

8 1216 a 37 ff., 1218 b 34–5.

9 I.e. σοφία in the strict technical sense of EN, ‘contemplative wisdom’.

10 Op. cit. p. 109.

1 See Part III, chapter 1.

2 I.e. the Platonic sense, and ‘practical wisdom’ in the sense of EN.

3 It is perhaps misleading to call this the ‘Platonic’ use, as I have so far done, since there is no suggestion that φρόνησις in this sense has anything to do with practical action, as the Platonic φρόνησις undoubtedly has. It is much more like a simple equivalent of σοφία—as, indeed, my criticism of Léonard implied.

4 See pp. 18–19 above.

5 Dirlmeier compares Pol. 1325 b 16–21. See also EN 1098 a 3, 14.

6 In EN, Aristotle takes care to avoid confusion by pairing πρᾶξις explicitly with ἐνέργεια.

1 1216 b 3–25.

2 P. 19.

3 I.e. in Part 1.

4 Cp. 1215 a 8–25, where it was suggested that happiness depended on a man and his actions being of a certain character (ποιός τις).

5 I.e. as he has done consistently throughout the preceding chapters, along with virtue and pleasure (the omission of any mention of pleasure from the programme here of course presents no problems, since discussion of it has already explicitly been deferred in the last few words).

1 I.e. at 1096 b 24, and 1098 b 24.

2 I.e. at 1097 b 2, where the list of examples is clearly intended to pick up that in the previous chapter (though νοῦς already appears there, at 1096 b 29).

3 Note also that at 1220 a 5 ff. EE gives σοφία and σύνεσις (and δεινότης) as examples of intellectual ἀρεταί; in the corresponding passage in EN (1103 a 3 ff.) we find σοφία, σύνεσις and φρόνησις. Even in this very general passage, I suggest, Aristotle is preparing for his later discussion.

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