The Battle for Hong Kong 1941-1945 by Oliver Lindsay

Author:Oliver Lindsay
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Tags: Military, Pacific Battlefields, World War II, History
ISBN: 9780750980548
Publisher: The History Press
Published: 2016-09-13T14:00:00+00:00

There were certainly no smiles at Stanley where Brigadier Wallis, out of touch with events elsewhere, seemed determined to fight on to ‘the last man and last round’.

As we have seen, Wallis had decided to withdraw the Royal Rifles to Stanley Fort because he felt it “imperative to clear the battlefield of disaffected troops liable to jeopardise the defence,” continues the Brigadier. Then, referring to himself in the third person, he writes, “The Brigade Commander stated he had also considered arresting or shooting Lt Col. Home and placing Maj. Price (2nd in C) in command. He had however refrained from doing so as he had come to the conclusion that many officers would require shooting – that it was in fact a bloodless mutiny.”3

Wallis wrote the above within nine months of the events. It seems apparent from his reference to shooting Canadian officers that he must have become seriously mentally unbalanced. Worse was to follow.

* * * * *

There are few, if any, examples in regimental histories of senior officers being suddenly removed from their commands. Letters found in Scotland, published recently in The Guards Magazine, the Journal of the Household Division, reveal one such case, although the official history of the Grenadier Guards does not refer to it. Brigadier R B R Colvin, commanding 24th Guards Brigade, was a highly experienced and capable Grenadier Guards officer who had been wounded at Dunkirk. In April 1943 his Divisional Commander, believing a German position at the Bou in North Africa to be lightly held, ordered him to advance his Brigade at once, although there was no tank support. Colvin protested and was told his attack must take place in daylight the next day. He reluctantly agreed, stipulating that they must start at 6.30 p.m., close to dusk, because there was so much open ground to cover. At noon on the appointed day the Divisional Commander said the attack must be brought forward to 4.00 p.m., which meant there would be no time for a reconnaissance or for briefing the Guardsmen; the attack would have to be carried out in the heat of an African afternoon although the men were still in their heavy battledress (as were the Canadians at Stanley); and at no stage of the attack would they have the advantage of surprise or the cover of darkness (again, like the Canadians at Stanley on Christmas Day).

Colvin refused to carry out these orders on the grounds that there would be unnecessary casualties. He was absolutely right. Yet he was immediately sacked and reduced in rank. The daylight attack, without him, proved extremely costly. In 1987 a Guards battlefield tour visited the Bou at exactly the same hour and date of the attack; the light was incredibly clear and it was obvious that the very strong German position of 1943 would have started killing the advancing Guardsmen at 1,000 yards.4

After some unhappy months commanding a reinforcement camp, Colvin was appointed Brigade Commander in Italy, was wounded at Monte Cassino and won the DSO.

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