Project on Nuclear Issues by unknow

Author:unknow
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781442259461
Publisher: Center for Strategic & International Studies

This emphasis on the broader aspects of strategic deterrence should be conveyed to allies in need of assurances that the United States’ extended deterrent is still credible and intact. In addition, the United States should keep its allies informed on the strength and validity of its retaliatory capability. A declassified Department of Defense study from 2012 indicated that, even if Russia were to increase its nuclear arsenal well above the New START limit, it would be unable to hold the U.S. second-strike capability at risk, therefore gaining no military advantages.37 This kind of information, in addition to conventional support, can be used to assure U.S. allies that a reduction to the U.S. nuclear force is not equivalent to a reduction in the U.S. ability to protect them.

Nuclear Multipolarity

One criticism of further nuclear reductions between the United States and Russia is that it incentivizes other nuclear-capable countries to build up their arsenals in an attempt to reach parity. The merits of that concern are debatable, as the significant costs of a massive nuclear production plan and the challenge of keeping that scheme a secret might outweigh the perceived benefits of increases in the size of a state’s nuclear stockpile. Nevertheless, China poses the most likely threat in this regard and is currently the only state that can feasibly build its arsenal to achieve quantitative parity with Russia and the United States.

While accurate and verified data is limited, China is believed to maintain an arsenal of around 250 nuclear weapons on a triad of strategic bombers, ICBMs, and nuclear submarines.38 Because of the considerable difference in arsenal size, China will not engage in multilateral arms control efforts until both Russia and the United States have further reduced their arsenals.

The current proposal, a one-third reduction of deployed strategic forces below New START, would not decrease the U.S. or Russian arsenals to a level that is readily vulnerable to a Chinese buildup, especially considering the large reserve stockpiles maintained by both countries. While direct inclusion of China in the next nuclear arms control pro cess is unlikely and unnecessary, the United States and Russia should focus on increasing the transparency of the Chinese nuclear enterprise to create space for multilateral efforts in the future. This poses a challenge of its own, as China values its nuclear opacity and is unlikely to offer increased transparency as a token of good faith.39 Instead, multilateral efforts between Britain, France, and China could incrementally establish transparency mechanisms to build trust for future agreements. Regardless, little progress is likely to be made with other nuclear-capable states until both Russia and the United States show further commitment to reducing their arsenals.

Domestic U.S. Challenges

Aside from the international challenges described, arms control efforts also face fierce opposition on the domestic front. Future plans for reductions will cost considerable political capital to proceed through a congressional review and into implementation.

Congressional Preferences

As the representative body of the people, Congress is positioned to play a critical role in any process that modifies the U.S. nuclear force.

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