Plato's Arguments for Forms by Robert William Jordan;

Author:Robert William Jordan;
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: -
Publisher: Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, LLC

NOTES

1. Aristotle’s Metaphysics 193.

2. Ross 193. Hardie also says that these two passages state ‘arguments along similar lines’ (13).

3. Aristotle’s Metaphysics Books M and N 153.

4. This point is noticed by Fine, ‘Knowledge and Belief in Republic V’ 137 and n. 22.

5. ‘Plato’s Distinction between Being and Becoming’ 83.

6. ‘A Proof in the Peri Ideoɗ 307-8.

7. Gosling, Plato, see esp. 156, 175 and 188; Vlastos, ‘A Metaphysical Paradox’ 54. For Vlastos, ‘Plato recognizes only one kind of knowledge’, ‘Degrees Of Reality’ 73.

8. Gosling, Plato 142.

9. On ‘patterns of becoming’, see Bolton 72-4.

10. Irwin’s view is also set out briefly in his Plato’s Moral Theory.

11. Plato’s Moral Theory 148.

12. ‘Plato’s argument for Forms did not rely … on s-change in the sensible world’. ‘Plato’s Heracliteanism’ 12.

13. ‘Plato’s Heracliteanism’ 6.

14. Cf. Bolton 74-6.

15. See 357 n. 1.

16. Bolton’s reconstruction of the argument has the advantage that it renders the argument valid; but it has the very considerable disadvantage that it requires us to read ‘false belief’ for ‘belief’ throughout (see 77, esp. n. 24).

17. See Annas 153.

18. Owen, ‘Proof 308.

19. Gosling, ‘Doxa and Dynamis in Plato’s Republic’ 121; Murphy, Plato’s Republic 105.

20. Fine (137 n. 22) makes the point that we must supply the premiss ‘there is knowledge’ for the argument to be valid. She compares here not only Timaeus 51 d, but also Parmenides 135ac. We may also compare Phaedo 74b2, where, as we saw in chapter 1, Socrates simply expects his interlocutor to agree that we have knowledge of the equal.

21. Gosling, ‘Doxa and Dynamis’ 129. Fine (125) rightly makes the point that other interpretations violate the condition of uncontroversiality. Kahn prefers to translate is-v by ‘is the case’, rather than ‘is true’; but nothing hangs on this for our present purposes.

22. Gosling, ‘Doxa and Dynamis’ 127, regards this passage as simply confused. Fine’s attempt to construe ‘nothing’ as ‘nothing true’ (131) is most implausible. It may indeed be the case, as she claims, that if I maintain that ‘justice is a vegetable’, this ‘does not amount to a claim about justice at all; it displays total ignorance of justice’. But she has made no attempt to come to terms with what Plato says here about believing one thing and believing no thing. Yet this is one of the main reasons for supposing is-e in play here.

23. See Kahn 121.

24. This is the point in the argument at which Plato moves from talking about opposites (beautiful and its opposite, and so on) to talking about being and not being (beautiful and so on).

25. Thus Vlastos turns at this point to the Symposium for elucidation of this (‘Degrees of Reality’ 66).

26. Owen, ‘Proof 307 n. 1. See too Murphy, esp. 110-1. Plato does, however, mention that Forms are unchanging at 479a2-3.

27. ‘Republic V: Ta Polla Kala’ 125.

28. ‘J. Gosling on Ta Polla Kala’ 128.

29. See 129-30.

30. Moravesik writes ‘temporal being is not complete being, what is temporal, both is and is not’ (11). F. C. White, ‘The Phaedo and Republic V on Essences’ 154, inadvertently points to one reason why Plato may emphasize change through time.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.