Ibn Sina's Remarks and Admonitions by Inati Shams C.;

Author:Inati, Shams C.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: PHI013000, Philosophy/Metaphysics, REL037010, Religion/Islam/History
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2014-06-17T04:00:00+00:00

Chapter 9. Remark: Concerning the Internal Senses (p. 373)

Perhaps you are inclined now to have us give you a minimal explanation concerning the issue of the powers that apprehend internally13 (p. 374) and to begin first of all with an explanation concerning the issue of the powers that are [most] related to the [external] senses.14 Listen then.

Do you not see the water drop falling as a straight line (p. 375) and the point that circles with rapidity as a circular line? All this is by way of observation and not by way of imagination or memory. You know that in vision only the form of that which faces [one] is represented (p. 376). That which falls or circles and which faces [one] is something like a point and not a line. There remains, therefore, in some of your powers the form of that which was first represented in vision; the present visual form is [then] conveyed to these powers. Therefore you have a power like the power that observes corresponding to vision and to which vision leads. It is in this power that the sensibles collect and are then apprehended by it (p. 377).

You also have a power that retains the images of the sensibles after the absence [of the sensibles] and as they group in it.

It is by virtue of these two powers that you can judge that this color is other than this (p. 378) taste and that that which has this color has this taste. That which judges these two matters needs to have the two things judged present to it together. Thus these are powers (p. 379).

Animals, be they rational or nonrational, also apprehend particular notions from particular sensibles. These notions are neither sensible nor arrived at by way of the senses. An example of this is the nonsensible notion that the sheep apprehends from the wolf and the nonsensible notion that the ram apprehends from the female sheep. This is a particular apprehension by means of which [this internal power] judges as the senses judge what they observe. Therefore you have a power to which this [function of judging] belongs. Besides, you, as well as many speechless animals, have a power that retains these notions after they have been judged by that which judges them. This power is other than that which retains the forms (p. 380). A specific bodily instrument and a specific name belong to every one of these powers.

The first power is that which is called common sense (al-ḥiss almushtarak) or phantasia (banṭāsiā) (p. 381). Its instrument is the spirit that is cast at the basis of the sense nerve, particularly, at the front of the brain.

The second power is called representational power (al-muṣawwira) or sensible memory (al-khayāl). Its instrument is the spirit that is cast in the interior cavity, particularly in the posterior side.

The third power is the estimation (al-wahm). Its instrument is the entirety of the brain; but the [part] most proper to it is the middle cavity (p. 382).

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