Bosnian Genocide by Bartrop Paul R.;

Author:Bartrop, Paul R.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 4332328
Publisher: ABC-CLIO, LLC

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Yugoslav conflict was closely intertwined with the post–Cold War adaptation of NATO itself. Many observers suggested that if NATO could not play a role in a conflict on its doorstep, such as that in Yugoslavia, then the alliance had little future. NATO, it was argued, must go “out of area” or go out of business. The Yugoslav conflict also provoked bitter disputes within NATO and between the alliance and the other international organizations involved in the conflict.

Initially, NATO played relatively little role in international efforts toward conflict management in Yugoslavia. The European Community (EC) led the international mediation efforts, and the United Nations (UN) played the central role in military peacekeeping. The relative disengagement of the United States from the early stages of the conflict further weakened NATO’s role in the former Yugoslavia.

Gradually, however, NATO came to play a growing role in the conflict. From July 1992, NATO naval forces monitored and enforced the UN arms embargo and economic sanctions against the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic Sea as part of Operation SHARP GUARD. From October 1992, NATO air forces monitored (and from March 1993, enforced) the UN-established no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In June 1993, the UN Security Council authorized “all necessary measures, through the use of air power” to support the UNPROFOR peacekeeping force in deterring attacks on the six UN-designated “safe areas.” This brought NATO air forces more directly into the Yugoslav conflict. There were disputes, however, among NATO’s members and with the UN about the circumstances in and the extent to which air strikes should be used. Authorization for the use of air power was provided by a complex “dual-key” arrangement, requiring both NATO and UN agreement for any air strikes. This arrangement, combined with the vulnerability of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeepers on the ground, limited the use and impact of NATO air power at this stage in the conflict.

Disputes over the use of NATO air power became intertwined with wider Western differences over policy toward the Yugoslav conflict, provoking some of the most bitter internal disputes in NATO’s history. In 1993, the Bill Clinton administration came to power advocating a policy of “lift and strike”—that is, lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims in order to enable them to defend themselves, and using air strikes against any Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat aggression. The United States was unable to persuade its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, the largest contributors to UNPROFOR, to support this policy. The United States accused Western Europeans of appeasement in the face of Serbian aggression and ethnic cleansing. Western European states pointed out that the United States was unwilling to deploy ground forces of its own and that any air strikes would make their own forces on the ground vulnerable targets for retaliation. The disagreements were so serious that observers suggested they threatened the very future of NATO itself. The overrunning of

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