U.S. Policy Toward South Asia by Shivaji Ganguly

Author:Shivaji Ganguly [Ganguly, Shivaji]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, Political Science, World, Asian, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780813379609
Google: eUueDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 4679584
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1990-06-13T00:00:00+00:00

Hence, Bhutto concluded that Pakistan’s best option was “to react more boldly and courageously” against India.40

After the Kutch conflict, President Ayub Khan had become quite receptive to the idea of a bolder approach towards New Delhi. This in turn had prompted the Foreign Office to take a harder line on Pakistan’s relations with India. In this context, the General Headquarters of the Army (GHQ) was persuaded to produce a specific action plan. Thus “Operation Gibraltar” was conceived—a guerrilla war plan—entrusted for implementation to Major-General Akhtar Malik who was in command of the 12th Division, covering the Kashmir area. His task entailed training a large number of armed infiltrators and saboteurs, who were supposed to slip across at carefully selected points on the 470-mile long cease-fire line into Jammu and the Kashmir area for the ultimate capture of power. The plan of action was based on three simplistic assumptions: there would be spontaneous popular support for the armed guerrillas inside the Kashmir Valley; India would not launch a counter-attack across the ceasefire line; and India was also unlikely to cross the international boundary with Pakistan. Subsequent events were to prove them all incorrect.41

It is amazing that this plan was approved by Ayub, given the likelihood of a major escalation with India. Admittedly, “criminal Foreign Office advice” as well as Bhutto’s assurances—regarding diplomatic deterrence against any possible decisive Indian reactions—had influenced Ayub’s decision to authorize the plan. Also, it is possible that the Army high command might have been pressured into a risky venture by an appeal to their valor42 However, Ayub was responsible for this wrongly conceived move. If this is how Pakistan stumbled into the September 1965 war, then it was without any systematic decision-making.

Pakistani’s strategy based on an over-optimistic assessment: that India was unlikely to react strongly to the Pakistani move. The rationale was that any major Indian counter-move, if not deterred by diplomatic means, would be constrained by the Chinese. Above all, Pakistan was itself materially well-equipped to defend against any vigorous Indian response. It is not definitely known whether it was because of Bhutto’s persuasiveness that Ayub Khan gave the signal for infiltration across the ceasefire line, but there is reason to believe that domestic pressures as well as his own overconfidence—due to his uninterrupted political successes—had a bearing on his decision to take the “attendant risks”.43 For Pakistan it looked like the finest hour was at hand.

Pakistani leadership had miscalculated the extent to which India would hit back militarily against a strategy of infiltration. India had on many occasions categorically pointed out that it would not remain unconcerned if there was any attempt to resolve the Kashmir question by force. In fact, as early as 1952, the then Indian Prime Minister Nehru had warned: “If Pakistan by mistake invades Kashmir, we will not only meet them in Kashmir, but it will be a full-scale war between India and Pakistan.”44

The Nehru doctrine had spelled out India’s stand so clearly as to leave no room for misinterpretation. But

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