Uncertain Allies by Klaus Larres

Author:Klaus Larres
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Yale University Press
Published: 2021-06-15T00:00:00+00:00

Kissinger’s Speech and the EC’s Response

To the utter surprise of many people, in April 1973, Kissinger grandly announced the Year of Europe to put transatlantic relations on a new footing, though of course still under firm US leadership. In his speech on April 23, 1973, at an Associated Press luncheon in New York’s luxurious Waldorf Astoria Hotel, Kissinger proposed a new comprehensive Atlantic Charter for “setting the goals for the future” and reinvigorating “shared ideals and common purposes.” The new grand charter would be signed by the president, Kissinger announced, during Nixon’s envisaged visit to Europe in the fall.82

Kissinger did not hesitate in his speech to emphasize that the US had global responsibilities, while the EC countries only had to deal with regional problems. He also insisted on a greater degree of military burden sharing, as only Europe’s economic contribution would guarantee the further functioning of the United States’ security umbrella.83 Both points but particularly the “quid pro quo” linkage between economic and security concerns led to severe difficulties with the western Europeans. Kissinger was quite right regarding the provinciality of Europe’s regional concerns, though no one in Europe wished to admit it. His speech, therefore, went down like a lead balloon.84 Kissinger had actually argued along very similar lines in his scholarly writings.85 This, however, had largely been forgotten. Instead, on the old continent, his Year of Europe proposals were received with both alarm and astonishment. Kissinger later defended himself by claiming that he had been misunderstood; he would be glad to see Europe develop into a global player. Yet the damage had been done. Besides, Kissinger did not really believe that the EC would become a global power anytime soon. “The Europeans are conducting a domestic but not a foreign policy,” he remarked toward the end of the year. “De Gaulle had a foreign policy,” but Pompidou only “has an economic policy.”86

Kissinger also maintained that he had not intended to put pressure on Europe by casting doubts about Washington’s defense commitment to the continent. In his speech, he indeed emphasized that “America remains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense” and that Nixon was “adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.”87 The American people, he added, however, had a right to expect a “rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared.” Kissinger continued by saying that “when this is achieved, the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe.” This indeed sounded like a conditional offer. In not-so-subtle words, he had also stated bluntly, “an unbridled economic competition … can sap the impulse for common defense.”88

At the same time, Kissinger attempted to come across as a strong supporter of the unity of Europe. The transatlantic alliance, he outlined, had “been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign policy” and “the stimulus for an unprecedented endeavor in European unity.” He even claimed that “no element” of US foreign policy had been “more consistent than our support of European unity,” though Washington “knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner.

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