Three Days at Gettysburg by Gary Gallagher

Author:Gary Gallagher
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The Kent State University Press

“No Troops on the Field

Had Done Better”

John C. Caldwell’s Division in

the Wheatfield, July 2, 1863

D. Scott Hartwig

IN THE 128 YEARS SINCE THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, VETERANS, students, and historians have filled volumes exploring the question of why the battle was lost or won. Such writers usually have focused on command at the army and corps level. There is nothing wrong with this emphasis, for the decisions and actions of senior officers shaped the battle and influenced thousands of lives. But these officers did not lead troops into battle. They managed resources, allocating men and material to obtain objectives. Command at this level can be likened to a sword. The hilt represents the army commander, the blade is the corps. The point of the sword represents those who directed soldiers in combat—the division, brigade, and regimental leaders. Although we know a great deal about what happened at the hilt and blade of the sword of command, we know relatively little about activity at the point. It is thus instructive to shift focus from the hilt and blade to the point. An examination of the experience of division command on July 2 illuminates the challenge of directing men in battle during the American Civil War.

The experience of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell and his First Division of the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac, illustrates the role of division leaders at Gettysburg. Caldwell’s division serves as an excellent model for two reasons. First, Caldwell conducted the only division-sized Federal assault in what was almost exclusively a defensive battle for the Army of the Potomac. Second, because defenders enjoyed significant advantages due to weaponry and tactics, it stands to reason that directing an attack was a division commander’s most difficult mission. Caldwell faced the particularly challenging situation of managing an attack in an extremely fluid battle in which he literally knew nothing about the ground or enemy strength. Although perhaps not typical, Caldwell’s experience reveals the problems with which division commanders contended in directing and coordinating an assault.

The First Division ranked among the outstanding units in the Army of the Potomac. It had been organized in the fall of 1861 by Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, who, despite limitations as a battlefield commander, understood how to train soldiers. When Sumner was promoted to corps command, the division passed to the equally tough Brig. Gen. Israel B. Richardson, who led it through the Seven Days battles and was mortally wounded during assaults against the Sunken Lane at Antietam. Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock succeeded Richardson, and the division fought magnificently under his direction in the grim attacks against Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg and during the Chancellorsville campaign. Sumner, Richardson, and Hancock left an indelible mark on the division, teaching the men sharp discipline and drill and imbuing them with an aggressive spirit. Hancock claimed at Gettysburg, without boast, that the division “had never flinched” on the field of battle.1

The First Division earned its enviable record at great cost. The only four-brigade division in the

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