The Battle of Lechfeld and Its Aftermath, August 955 by Bowlus Charles R

Author:Bowlus, Charles R. [Bowlus, Charles R.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781351894166
Publisher: TaylorFrancis
Published: 2014-09-15T00:00:00+00:00

Envelopment

The Magyar leaders would without a doubt have preferred a battle on the open plains of the Lech (either to the north and/or south of Augsburg) rather than an encounter in the woodlands west of the city. However, they were obviously aware of the possibility that the king might advance through the Rauherforst, for they had a contingency plan to engage him there. They had posted Berthold in Reisensburg to observe Otto’s movements and to give them ample warning of a relief column advancing from that direction. Since Berthold brought his warning to the besiegers on the morning of 9 August, he must have departed Reisensburg no later than early afternoon on the preceding day (see Map 2). Traveling with only a small entourage, Berthold could stay well ahead of the slow-moving relief column, which, due to the fact that the Magyars had wasted the countryside, was burdened with a supply train. Nonetheless, the column must have reached Reisensburg around midday 8 August and then continued along the road to Horgau on the westernrim of the Rauherforst. This site, 16 kilometers from Augsburg, was the most logical place for an encampment on the evening of 9 August.42

The Magyars’ plan, which had an excellent chance of success, was based on encirclement. Detachments of mounted archers were ordered to slip behind the relief column and attack the rear as it proceeded through the Rauherforst. Meanwhile, the remainder of the Hungarian army deployed near Westheim, in the Schmutter valley opposite Ottmarshausen, where the king’s army would have to exit the woodlands. If these plans succeeded, Otto’s army would be trapped between the hammer of an encircling force of archers and the anvil, the main army consisting of mounted bowmen and infantry drawn up in front of them.

As Otto’s forces were pitching their camp at Horgau, detachments of Magyar archers making up the encircling force were establishing themselves somewhere near Dinkelscherben in the Reischenau, 25 kilometers from Augsburg, 9 kilometers southwest of Otto’s encampment. Their best route to the vicinity of Dinkelscherben would have been up the Schmutter valley to Gessertshausen, then over a low divide. Mounted archers with fresh horses could have easily covered this distance, even if they had departed Augsburg in the afternoon. Each rider would have brought an additional mount, but no more. Surprise was essential, and long strings of horses would have spread the units out, increasing the chances of detection. To a great extent, however, forests and hills between Horgau and Reischenau would have concealed their movements. Thus at the end of the day, 9 August, they could slip behind Otto’s column to avoid being detected, positioning themselves to attack the king’s forces from the rear on the following morning. Widukind writes that scouts had seen the opposing army approaching. This report, however, must refer to the main Hungarian army that was deploying near Westheim on the eastern side of the woods, for the king was completely unaware of the danger lurking in the rear to the west. ‘Things developed differently than expected,’ Widukind succinctly wrote.

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