State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (RLE Saudi Arabia) by Tim Niblock

Author:Tim Niblock [Niblock, Tim]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138846753
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2016-09-28T00:00:00+00:00

The Radical—Conservative Contest

Whether the vantage point has been al-Riyadh, Baghdad, Muscat or one of the emirates of eastern Arabia, a major dimension of the competition between radical and conservative forces in the area has been the asymmetry of the contest — until the Iranian Revolution. For example, until 1979 only one state, Iraq, could be classified as 'radical' in terms of its political values and orientation toward the rest. The other Arab Gulf states were 'conservative' or 'moderate' states. To this day these polities are ruled by dynasts whose foreign policies and official attitudes have by and large been quite friendly not only to Western countries, but to the evolutionary forces of political and socio-economic change operating in the Gulf, the Middle East and elsewhere. With Saudi Arabia at the forefront, the internal political and legal systems of the Gulfs conservative Arab states continue to leave little room for manoeuvre to the as-yet small minority of the citizenry and non-national residents who harbour radical or revolutionary sentiments. To be sure, the revolution in Iran and the seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by religious fanatics in 1979 has served to heighten the anxieties of all the Gulf regimes. In the aftermath of these and other events, the rulers have gone to some length to indicate their determination to anticipate and accommodate as many legitimate demands for change and/or conservation as possible. Their goal is to provide a means of preventing extremist groups from gaining — or, where this has already occurred, from retaining — a foothold of any significance in the area.

Among the Gulf's Arab actors, one of the most important points to underscore is the striking numerical imbalance in the ratio of radical to conservative states. Indeed, this fact has long been such an obvious constant in the interplay of regional forces that it is often discounted by outsiders, especially among many strategists and economists who view the area in impersonal terms. Yet in practice its implications pose a formidable array of obstacles to the area's actual and would-be dissidents. Iraq's geographic and ideological isolation are but two factors which place constraints on its capacity — not to mention its interest or willingness — to foment internal unrest in the other Arab states of the Gulf. Another is the fact that of the 'overseas Iraqis' — individuals whose numbers in these states are tinier than miniscule few have demonstrated an interest or inclination to become involved in an effort to topple the area's traditional regimes.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran all have, of course, lengthy borders with Iraq. This, however, has not enhanced significantly Iraq's opportunities to foment internal dissidence in these states or even to contribute substantially to forces seeking to foster instability in those countries' border regions. On the contrary, throughout most of the 1970s, Iraqi subversive activities were largely offset by Iran's capacity as, for example, through the assistance it lent the autonomy-minded Kurds in the northern part of the country — for creating a wide range of problems for the Iraqi government.

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