Space Policy Alternatives by Radford Byerly Jr

Author:Radford Byerly Jr. [Byerly, Radford Jr.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781000240924
Goodreads: 52399223
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-06-21T00:00:00+00:00

These recommendations are based on a philosophy of reduced programmatic risk which we advance below. They are designed to enhance the resiliency of the US space science effort against internal and external perturbations (e.g., cost over-runs, launch failures, budgetary constraints).

The SESAC Report and OSSA's Strategic Plan

An important and striking point made by the 1986 SESAC report is that the crisis in space science was not caused by the Challenger accident, but largely by a concentration of resources in a diminishing number of space missions of increasing size. The signs of crisis, evident long before the accident occurred, included: (1) the timely funding of planned missions was becoming increasingly unreliable; (2) missions were suffering massive cost overruns and schedule stretch-outs; and (3) the consequent long delays in launching scientific payloads and the insecure prospects for the future were leading to the demoralization of scientists and erosion of expertise in disciplines in space science. The Challenger accident exacerbated these problems and brought the issues into sharper focus.

The major recommendations of the SESAC Report were that:

The OSSA program should incorporate a diverse array of scientific activities, participants, and facilities. In particular, OSSA should strive for diversity in the scale of missions, a vigorous and stable research and analysis program, and involvement in substantial international collaborations.

The scientific requirements of missions must be the dominant factor in the choice of the launch vehicle. This recommendation included a clear call for greater reliance on expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) for scientific payloads.

A more rigorous planning process should be instituted in the OSSA program, including more realistic assessment of mission costs and resources and tighter control of costs and schedule. In particular, NASA should not make commitments to the definition and design (Phase B) of missions in the absence of convincing evidence that the missions can be started and completed on schedule, and that the financial resources will be available as required to support the proposed schedule.

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