Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine by Ariel Levite

Author:Ariel Levite [Levite, Ariel]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780429710056
Google: JCmNDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 44598234
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-03-01T00:00:00+00:00

As a result of this Arab response, even if the IAF were to be authorized again to preempt and attack Arab air bases and air defense installations, the most it could realistically expect to achieve would be air superiority. Certainly it is quite unlikely to gain any sort of freedom of action over the battlefield comparable to that which characterized the onset of the Six-Day War. Attaining air superiority over the battlefield obviously is no mean thing. But then the traditional rationale for Israeli aerial preemption, as well as for massive investment in the IAF, has never regarded the attainment of air superiority as an end in itself, but rather as a means to an end: freeing the IAF to engage in a variety of support missions ranging from close air support (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction — to interdiction, assault transport and medical evacuation.

Another prime target for a preemptive Israeli strike is the Arab surface-to-surface missile (SSM) batteries. The incentive for the IDF to knock these out in a preemptive strike continues to rise with their growing number, range, destructiveness and lethality (they now may be armed with non-conventional warheads), and in view of the ongoing absence of an effective defensive response against them once they are launched.46 Yet the growing number and increasing mobility of Arab SSMs like the SS-21s, coupled with proliferation to additional countries capable of hitting Israel, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, significantly complicate the operational and political problems associated with their destruction. In fact, the likelihood that the IAF would not be able to destroy them all in a preemptive strike is very high, thereby exposing Israel to painful retaliation.47

Israeli military preemption might still serve a variety of additional and far from negligible objectives. It could disrupt the enemy's war effort by preventing or at least delaying the arrival at the front of foreign expeditionary forces (e.g., from Iraq) as well as reinforcements from the rear. It might also facilitate the rapid seizure of vital areas at a relatively low cost — for example the capture of the Giddi and Mitla passes in the event of an imminent military confrontation with Egypt. Finally, if it does not exact from the IDF too heavy a toll in casualties and attrition, preemption is likely to have an adverse psychological effect on the adversary's armed forces and a correspondingly positive one on one's own forces — irrespective of direct military results.

In the final analysis, then, the military benefits of Israeli preemption are not as great as the Israeli military consistently tries to imply.48 Nor are they negligible. Were they to be evaluated strictly in terms of military cost-effectiveness, the net conclusion would probably be that preemption is indeed desirable. Yet military preemption inevitably exacts a political price.

How significant a political price is Israel likely to have to pay for militarily preempting one or more of its Arab neighbors? Here it is important to recognize that a considerable portion of the price is generated by the difficulty

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