Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China by Baogang He

Author:Baogang He [He, Baogang]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138634282
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2019-11-11T00:00:00+00:00

The relations between state and popular nationalism

State nationalism in China has used popular nationalism and anti-America slogans to provide legitimacy for its regime. The Party-state has co-opted popular nationalism to sell the official definition of patriotism, and has even granted freedom of expression and increased the level of political tolerance for popular nationalists who can write and publish their works (chapter 3).

Nevertheless, some intellectuals hesitate to recognize the current Chinese state as a legitimate representation of the Chinese nation. Chinese cultural nationalists have their own largely hidden agenda that targets Maoist ideology and the Party-state. They are making their own vision of ‘nation’, even excluding, or rejecting, socialist national identity as defined by the Party-state. Chinese popular nationalism may constitute a threat to the CCP and ultimately undermine the dominance of the CCP (chapter 3).

Similarly, Taiwanese popular nationalism has undermined the old state nationalism of the KMT. The KMT’s old state nationalism in Taiwan, linked to the project of unification, has become weaker, and its anti-Communist identity has faded into history. Moreover, the KMT cultivates an indigenous image, with its indigenous wing seeking the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity. The Taiwanization of the KMT regime, an increasingly free and assertive mass media, and an awakening electorate, all have challenged the assumption that the Mainlander-KMT elite can impose its vision of unification on the remaining segments of Taiwan’s relevant political strata.23

The concept of the ‘New Taiwanese’, advocated by President Lee in December 1998 (or earlier in 1995), indicates that Taiwanese nationalism has already developed into a kind of neo-state nationalism. Over the years, steps have been taken to instill, within the younger generation of Mainlanders, the notion that they too are Taiwanese. In his later years, Chiang Ching-kuo frequently remarked that, having lived in Taiwan for so long, he considered himself to be both Chinese and Taiwanese.24 There is considerable evidence that Mainlanders, living in Taiwan, will increasingly consider themselves Taiwanese. As Yu-tzung Chang reports, in a 1992 survey, 19.8 percent of the respondents regarded themselves as ‘Taiwanese’, 29 percent as ‘Chinese’, and 45 percent as both. In 1995, however, the above figures changed to 30.1 percent, 18 percent, and 47.3 percent, respectively. The percentage of those who regarded themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ had increased by 10.3 percentage points, while those who considered themselves ‘Chinese’ decreased by 11 percentage points.25

The notion of the New Taiwanese was used by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, several years ago, in calling upon Mainlanders living in Taiwan to relinquish what it called their ‘greater China’ mentality.26 It was not adopted as official ideology until President Lee Teng-hui presented the idea of the New Taiwanese as a means of promoting national harmony, during campaigning for the December 5 1998 legislative, mayoral and city council elections.27 Lee appealed to voters to support his party’s candidate for the Taipei mayorship,. describing the candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, as a ‘New Taiwanese’. The concept of New Taiwanese aims to nurture a common identity among the various sub-ethnic groups and unite all citizens in the pursuit of political reforms.

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