Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading Squadron during the Civil War by Browning Jr. Robert M

Author:Browning Jr., Robert M.
Language: eng
Format: azw3
ISBN: 9780817387785
Publisher: University of Alabama Press
Published: 2015-04-29T16:00:00+00:00

14

Heigh-Ho! The Sabine Pass?

Sabine Pass

In late summer 1863, the Union leadership’s fluid approach to war strategy took another change in course. The capture of Mobile had loomed as the next goal, and Banks and Farragut had discussed an attack there before the admiral sailed north. Lincoln realized that Mobile was an important target, Grant wanted to strike Mobile to pressure the Confederates, and the capture of this port remained important in the navy’s overall strategy. The loss of this port to the Confederacy would set the Southern war effort back appreciably.1

The situation in Mexico, however, changed Union strategy. In the fall of 1862, the French landed twenty-six hundred men and fought their way to the Mexican capital, entering Mexico City on 10 June. This created additional concern for the Lincoln government, thinking the French might court the Confederacy and give it aid and recognition. Napoleon III might even invite Texas to leave the Confederacy in order to set up an independent republic—an ever more dire scenario for the United States. The French presence was a direct challenge to the Monroe Doctrine and compelled the president to show some force. Lincoln did not instruct Grant to form an expedition to Texas but indicated he was particularly interested in “re-establishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible.” Henry Halleck, a proponent of a strike in the Trans-Mississippi up the Red River, also favored a move on Texas.2

There were, however, several conflicting agendas for a Union expedition in Texas. Near the end of July, in a meeting at the War Department, Welles, Seward, Stanton, and Halleck discussed the situation. Halleck remained undecided whether Mobile or Galveston was more important. Halleck knew Grant felt it more urgent to operate against Mobile, because pressure on the Confederates there was more important than almost any campaign in the Trans-Mississippi. Grant argued that merely sending a garrison to Brownsville could neutralize any threat of foreign intervention and later wrote “it would have been an easy thing to capture Mobile at the time.” Grant renewed his request in July and August. Welles had suggested a move on Brownsville to close down the trade at Matamoros, but also to protect the “loyal citizens in Western Texas.”3

Welles also recommended a landing at Indianola to accomplish the president’s wishes. Halleck did not even know the location of this town. Welles argued that Indianola was closer to the Rio Grande than Galveston and had a deeper harbor, but Halleck “settled down very stolidly” and said he “would not make a decision until he communicated with Banks.”4

In fact, Halleck had already sent communications with a decision. On 15 July he sent a telegram to Grant that, “No expedition to Texas will be undertaken at present.” The goal given was to first completely control Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana. He also wrote Banks to this effect.5

On 1 August, believing the Texas Expedition canceled, Banks wrote Halleck that Mobile might surrender if the Union attacked quickly. He related that the “panic from the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson” had the enemy unprepared for an assault by an overland march.

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