Liberating Kosovo by Phillips David L.;Burns Nicholas;

Author:Phillips, David L.;Burns, Nicholas; [Phillips, David L.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 3339469
Publisher: MIT Press
Published: 2012-08-22T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter 7

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 was adopted on June 10, 1999. It ended the war and established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the executive, judicial, and legislative authority for Kosovo. As specified in the resolution, UNMIK’s responsibilities included “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered.”1 To this end, it authorized “Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence in Kosovo.”2 UNMIK was also given responsibility for establishing provisional systems of self-government and “facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.”3

The resolution, which left Kosovo in a state of ambiguity, was crafted so that all parties could claim a diplomatic victory. While making vague references to a political settlement, the preamble “reaffirm[ed] the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” Annex 1 referred to “an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo.”4 The resolution called for demilitarization of the KLA and “confirm[ed] that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo.”5 Despite these concessions, Belgrade rejected UNMIK and classified it as a “belligerent occupant” in international law; however, Belgrade had no authority in Kosovo or over UNMIK.

Placing responsibility for Kosovo’s future under the jurisdiction of the UNSC gave Russia de-facto control. Any change in Kosovo’s status would require approval from the UNSC, where Russia wielded a veto. While the resolution set out the path to sovereignty, it did not identify specific criteria that would result in Kosovo’s independence. Without a sunset clause, Resolution 1244 would exist until the UNSC passed a new resolution.

Western diplomats hoped that Kosovo and Serbia would eventually agree on the terms of their separation and that their agreement would be sanctioned by the UN, thereby smoothing Kosovo’s path to recognition and independence. International agreements, however, must not be based on wishful thinking. It was a mistake to leave Kosovo in limbo. Morton Abramowitz believes, “We perpetuated the Kosovo problem by not cutting it clean. We should never have left Kosovo a part of Serbia.”6

Security

On June 11, 1999, a British helicopter collected KLA General Agim Ceku after midnight and brought him to NATO Lieutenant General Michael Jackson’s headquarters in Kumanova. Ceku was ushered into a room full of senior NATO officers and given a paper informing him that Belgrade had agreed to withdraw its forces, and that NATO ground troops would be entering Kosovo. The paper stipulated that NATO would be the only armed force in Kosovo and that the KLA, as an armed group, must hand over all its weapons and equipment to NATO. “I was shocked,” said Ceku. “I told them, I am not representing an armed group. I am chief of the general staff.

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