Hitler's Nordic Ally? by Claes Johansen

Author:Claes Johansen [Johansen, Claes]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, World War II, Europe, Eastern
ISBN: 9781473853171
Google: Ets2EAAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pen and Sword Military
Published: 2016-02-28T00:42:01+00:00

III

The Finnish Choice

The psychologists have known for a long time that people rarely act on the basis of one single motive.

On the contrary, both individuals and groups in practice collect information from many different events and use them as a foundation for their decisions.

Hence, it is better to speak of ‘sets of motives’.

This expression is well suited to the choice that was made in Finland in 1941.

MAUNO JOKIPII215

Alliance or Separate Wars?

During the summer of 1940 the Finnish leaders were facing two very tangible problems: how to prevent a famine from breaking out, and how to protect their country against what was perceived as the acute danger of a new Soviet invasion. On top of that there was the possibility of being invaded by Nazi Germany, whose occupation of Denmark and Norway had shown how important it was for the German war machine to secure its iron ore imports from northern Sweden, and who had been in no way helpful towards Finland during the Winter War. In the worst of cases, it might all happen at once: two invasions by the great totalitarian powers at the same time, coming from either side, could lead to Finland being divided, as had happened in Poland.

Moscow offered Finland help with foodstuffs and military protection against Germany, but such a plan had already been rejected by the Finnish leaders before the Winter War. Since then the war itself and the subsequent full Soviet annexation of the Baltic States had only increased Finnish suspicions towards the Kremlin. Furthermore, the persecution of Finno-Ugric people in East Karelia and Ingria (p. 258) was already well known to the Finns from refugees fleeing across the border into Finland. Seen in the light of these circumstances a Finnish-Soviet trade and defence agreement was completely unrealistic.

More broadly viewed, the question was if Finland should maintain its neutrality and try to tackle the problems as they presented themselves, or if the country should move into the German camp. If neutrality was chosen, the two abovementioned main problems would remain unsolved, which was seen as in practice unbearable and potentially as a catastrophic situation. In contrast to this, cooperation with Germany would solve both problems and it also held other advantages.

The Finnish leaders, like many others at that time, were almost convinced that a war between Germany and the Soviet Union would break out, and that Germany would end up winning it. If Finland was on good terms with Berlin, this situation would open the possibility of winning back the territories that had been lost in the Winter War – plus more (an aspect we shall return to). But cooperation with Germany would also include a string of secondary problems and risks. Somewhat schematically the choice could be presented as follows:

Advantages of Cooperating with Germany

• Would solve the food supply problem

• Give protection against the Soviet Union

• Could bring back the lost territories

• Open for further conquests of Soviet territory

• Make it possible to take the war into enemy territory and thereby protect

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