Flirting with Disaster by Marc Gerstein

Author:Marc Gerstein
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Sterling Publishing Co., Inc.

INADEQUATE PREPARATION AND TRAINING

Beyond those issues, several other factors inhibited AWACS crew members’ ability to use what information that they did have to avert the tragedy. In particular, while the AWACS crew consisted of experienced personnel and leaders, this was their first actual mission flying together. Clearly, any group operating as a unit for the first time is likely to have a learning curve, especially related to interdependencies among separate roles, responsibilities for which they had not been trained, and judgments that contravened organizational norms or formal protocols, such as the Air Tasking Order.

Of course, the importance of that kind of teamwork is recognized by AWACS command, and standard provisions existed to prepare the crew for their work together. Potentially the most powerful tool in the preparatory arsenal is a “mission simulator,” which, with the right software, is capable of exposing the entire crew to virtually identical conditions to those they will encounter in the field. Simulators are invaluable training tools because they can provide far more preparation for unusual events than people are likely to get in most real-life situations.

Unfortunately, three significant problems impeded the full use of that tool. First, the entire crew was not available for the simulation; most important, only one leader was available. Second, the crew’s second simulator run was canceled because of a competing exercise. Third, the simulator programming was inconsistent with the actual situation. Significantly, it lacked helicopter-tracking scenarios, it did not employ the same rules of engagement, and it certainly did not include the critical “informal” responsibility to act as a relay station for Eagle Flight information beyond that on the Air Tasking Order. The most important aspects of AWACS’s potential role in the prevention of this accident were therefore missing from the crew’s pre-mission training, thus making it necessary for the crew to learn the old-fashioned way—by direct instruction and trial and error.

During the accident investigation, it emerged that preparing new simulator programming was considered too expensive, and it also came to light that there was even a shortage of conventional training materials, such as manuals. As we have seen in many cases, financial pressures are often responsible for increasing the likelihood of many different kinds of disasters.

In addition, a rash of early retirements had occurred in the air force as a result of defense spending cutbacks associated with the “peace dividend” after the end of the Cold War. That attrition had the effect of promoting to senior positions personnel who might otherwise have been passed over or allowed to mature further in junior positions. Evidence suggests that this AWACS crew had inconsistent performance records. While a first-class crew might have overcome the various obstacles described, this crew was uneven in ability, and appears not to have had the right stuff to do so.

Many of the problems listed might also have been overcome had the direct leadership onboard the AWACS been strong and effective. It was not. Even so, institutional reliance on exceptional midlevel leadership to overcome systemic organizational weaknesses is a risky proposition.

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