U.S. Foreign Policy and Asian-Pacific Security: A Transregional Approach by William T. Tow

Author:William T. Tow [Tow, William T.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Ethnic Studies, American, Asian American Studies, Social Science, Political Science, World, Asian, Regional Studies
ISBN: 9780367212308
Google: 1qybDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 46180136
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1982-06-01T00:00:00+00:00

U.S. Security Perceptions and Policy Responses

American policy changes toward Asia since 1975 have appeared reactive and inconsistent.32 Those who preferred a low profile and reduced American commitments argued that rapprochement with China left only the Soviet Union as a regional adversary and that Moscow's political position in Asia is weak. What this argument ignores, however, is that America is a Pacific power with the bulk of its trade and rapidly growing investment carried out in that region. Moreover, because Japan depends on Southeast Asian shipping lanes for almost all of its petroleum, the Seventh Fleet serves to protect vital commercial waterways for the United States' most important regional ally and trading partner.

An opposing view contends that while the Soviets are a genuine threat to Asia, the United States should no longer be required to meet that threat alone. Instead, Washington should create the broadest possible united front against the Soviet Union, including Japan, China, and the ASEAN states. (This, in effect, has been the Chinese strategy since 1978). The problem with this approach is that it would further exacerbate tensions with Moscow and tend to force Soviet-American relations back into the Cold War mold of the 1950s. Moreover, U.S. support for China's "united front" policy could have the unintended effect (from Washington's perspective) of abetting the creation of Chinese hegemony in the region which, in turn, could lead to fissures within ASEAN. Malaysia and Indonesia are at least as suspicious of China as they are of Vietnam. Nevertheless, as the Soviet Union continues to strengthen its military presence in Vietnam, U.S. policymakers concerned with meeting and deterring the Soviet challenge have tended to respond by reinforcing links with China and by providing more military aid to the ASEAN states.

Support for the ASEAN governments has created another dilemma for the United States. Because American alliance diplomacy is severely constrained in Southeast Asia, Washington's participation consists of backing friendly states. But, insofar as the United States becomes involved in supporting ASEAN incumbents, it is then identified with authoritarian regimes which, for the most part, are concerned less with social justice than the aggregate development of their economies. While ASEAN has been notably successful in the past decade in increasing aggregate growth rates, disparities between the poor and the rich in these societies have been exacerbated. Ruling elites are narrowly based in the gentry and industrial/technocratic classes and backed by the military.

In the context of all the above considerations, Washington has made a number of gestures to demonstrate that there will be no U.S. withdrawal from Asia. In 1978, Vice President Mondale visited the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Important new aid agreements were signed in Bangkok and Jakarta, while serious negotiations led subsequently to a renewal of the U.S. bases agreement in Manila.33 In 1979 and 1980, Washington expanded its military sales to the ASEAN states, particularly by providing easy terms for Thailand. In 1981, Vice President Bush endorsed Philippine President Marcos' reelection and praised his decision to lift martial law, moves which

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