The Franco-Prussian War Volume 2 by H.M. Hozier

Author:H.M. Hozier
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: HISTORY/Europe/France
Publisher: Pyrrhus Press
Published: 2014-08-01T00:00:00+00:00

FINAL RESUME OF THE EVENTS OF THE WAR, AND MLTJTARY OPINION OF THE SIEGE OF PARIS.

In Chapters IV. and V. of this work we described in detail the various features of the military systems of France and Germany respectively. A number of books and pamphlets published after the war threw additional light upon these characteristics, and their influence upon the singular course of the events of the campaign. Any one conversant with the systems of the two nations would naturally suppose, from the readiness with which Napoleon III. plunged into the struggle, either that he was ignorant of the immense superiority of the German organization, or that he believed the war would bring into relief in the French military machine decisive reforms, which Marshal Niel was supposed to have carried out into law. The reforms, however, proved to have been only upon paper, and the writings of the emperor himself show that he was quite familiar with the numerical and other disadvantages of his army as compared with that of Germany; but his dependence was upon a somewhat desperate and rapidly executed strategy, which proved to be utterly impracticable. What the war, even within a week or two from the time when it was declared, did bring into prominent and terrible relief, was a monstrous imperfection in the French organization, of which the War office was grossly and unpardonably ignorant; and this ignorance forms the key to the overwhelming misfortunes we have narrated.

Considerable indignation was at first vented against Colonel Stoffel, the French military attaché at Berlin, for not having more fully apprised his government of the immense resources and preparations for hostilities throughout Germany. Immediately after the war, however, Baron Stoffel published the reports on these subjects which he had made from 1866 to 1870, many of which it transpired had never so much as been opened. These reports not only described most fully the formidable nature of the German organization, but pointed out in contrast the feebleness and inefficiency of the French system; and had the Imperial government studied them, it would have been more fully alive to the madness of the enterprise entered upon on the dark and calamitous 15th July, 1870.

According to a calculation of Baron Stoffel made some months before hostilities broke out, and essentially corresponding with that of the Emperor Napoleon in January, 1871, the standing army of France consisted of 372,558 men and 72,600 horses, whereas that of Northern and Southern Germany, when united, amounted to about 429,000 men, and from 80,000 to 90,000 horses. Thus, even in the single particular in which it was generally believed in Europe that she would possess a decided advantage—a regular army ready for the field—France was considerably overmatched; but this disproportion gives no idea of her immense inferiority in military power to her enemy. Apart from an unknown number of discharged soldiers and worn-out veterans, and from the practically worthless national guard, the whole reserves of France were composed of about 320,000 men, the residue of

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.