Morality Made Visible by Otto Pipatti

Author:Otto Pipatti [Pipatti, Otto]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Social Science, General, Sociology
ISBN: 9781351169141
Google: OwaQDwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-04-01T03:46:35+00:00

The motive of the act

Westermarck distinguishes between intention and motive. Motive is the underlying cause of, or the reason for, the agent’s intention, in other words, ‘that which “moves” the will’ (ODMI, p. 207; ER, p. 150). As Blanshard (1961) puts it, Westermarck argues that we ‘pass judgments on what a man does, but we do so in the light of what he intended to do’, and, furthermore, ‘what moved him to do it’ (p. 111). Motives, however, are usually given less attention than intentions. This is because intention is normally apparent in the act itself, whereas the underlying motive is not. In practice, motives and intentions ‘are subjects of moral valuation not separately, but as a unity’ (ODMI, pp. 207–209, 283).

Motives influence moral evaluation in two ways. First, we need to make a distinction between motives that are intentions and motives that are non-voluntary and beyond the agent’s control. A motive belonging to the first category ‘obviously falls within the sphere of moral valuation’ (ODMI, p. 207; ER, p. 150). We do not feel gratitude if someone helps us merely in the hope of a reward. When we are being lied to, our feelings towards that person are very different depending on whether he or she is attempting to benefit from our expense or trying to save us from serious trouble (ODMI, pp. 316, 318). When the agent’s motive is an intention itself, it belongs to another but related act. This is because, for Westermarck, a single act can only have one intention. For example, when dissidents try to kill the dictator in order to save their country, we have two distinct but related acts. Their intention to save the country is the motive of their intention to kill the dictator. There is no doubt that it affects many people’s opinions on the matter (ODMI, p. 207; ER, p. 150).

Secondly, motives that are involuntary impulses are not as such morally loaded, but they ‘may nevertheless indirectly exercise much influence on moral judgements’. This is because motives of this sort are generally considered as mitigating circumstances. When a person steals food to satisfy his or her hunger, appetite as an involuntary impulse has no moral value in itself. No one is held blameworthy for his or her hunger. However, ‘other things being equal, the person in question is less guilty in proportion as his hunger is more intense’. It is thus clear that in this and many other cases, ‘moral judgment is modified by the pressure which the non-volitional motive exercises upon the agent’s will’ (ODMI, pp. 207–208; also ER, pp. 150–151). Similarly, we feel differently towards a person who injures us ‘under the influence of a non-volitional impulse, too strong for any ordinary man to resist’. The same applies to actions people are compelled against their will. Both in ordinary moral judgements and modern criminal legislation, acting under compulsion reduces or wholly eliminates responsibility (ODMI, pp. 283–284, 316).

Emotions, too, are held as mitigating considerations. Westermarck recognises that people may be so overwhelmed by anger or fear that they cannot resist acting in a certain way.

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