Franco by Stanley G. Payne

Author:Stanley G. Payne [Stanley G. Payne and Jesús Palacios]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University of Wisconsin Press

A month after completion of the concordat, on September 26, three pacts were signed in Madrid with Washington, bringing to a close nearly two years of at times arduous negotiations. The agreements dealt with “assistance for mutual defense,” “economic assistance,” and finally common defense arrangements “to face the dangers that threaten the Western world,” the latter referring to the opening of American military bases on Spanish soil.

The military assistance agreement would provide more up-to-date weaponry to replace the stock of the Spanish army and air force, scarcely rejuvenated since 1939, together with new training programs for Spanish officers. The old German and Soviet planes and captured Soviet tanks could eventually be retired, replaced by Spain’s first jet aircraft and better armored vehicles, though the process would take several years. This modernization of the armed forces would nonetheless be severely limited by lack of interest in spending money on the military, after a disproportionate amount of the budget had been consumed by the latter in the first troubled years after the Civil War.

The economic assistance amounted to $226 million, later supplemented by further grants. The counterpart measures that the United States required were steps to liberalize the heavily regulated economy, and the new ministers appointed in 1951 were already hesitantly moving in that direction. Since Spain had been excluded from the Marshall Plan, this was the first major foreign aid ever received, and it helped to promote the rapid and sustained economic growth that continued through 1958.

In the third pact, the United States gained the right to establish three air bases in Spain in Torrejón (Madrid), Morón (Seville), and Zaragoza, plus a submarine base on the southern coast in Rota (Cádiz). The bases would display the Spanish flag and be under the joint military command of the two states. In addition, the bases pact contained a secret clause that provided that, in the event of “clear Communist aggression,” the United States could take action unilaterally so long as “both countries communicate mutually their information and intentions with maximal urgency.” This clause would not be eliminated until 1970.93

Franco presented the pacts to the Cortes on October 1, declaring that no Spanish territory had been handed over to the United States. He also used the opportunity to condemn Churchill publicly for having refused his offer of alliance in October 1944, observing that it had been the mistake of an imperial power in decline. This was the final step in the international rehabilitation of Franco, though it always remained relative and limited.

It was also the coup de grâce for the Republican opposition, which at this point virtually gave up, though a shadow government in exile, periodically renewed, would continue to exist. Perhaps the most bitterly disappointed were the Basque nationalists, who, more than any other opposition group, had played the “American card” consistently since Pearl Harbor, providing secret intelligence to Washington from Spain and from Latin America.94 They had looked confidently toward American assistance in the overthrow of Franco and the future partition of Spain.

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