The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-examination by Sokolov Boris

Author:Sokolov, Boris
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: HISTORY / Military / World War II
ISBN: 9781909384712
Publisher: Helion
Published: 2013-04-24T00:00:00+00:00

A.N. Mertsalov, citing research by several scholars from the Institute of the Theory and History of Socialism (under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and from East and West Germany, determines irreversible Wehrmacht losses on the Eastern Front to be 2.8 million men, and those of the Red Army at 14 million, giving a correlation of 1:5. However, as with Volkogonov, he does not substantiate these figures.5 An attempt by V.V. Alekseev and V.A. Isupov in 1986 to determine losses of the draftees born in 1890-1924 by analyzing data on the number of males and females in this age bracket on the basis of the 1926 and 1959 censuses deserves mention. They estimate losses to be 11.8 million males (the overwhelming majority serving in the Red Army) and 2.1 million women. These authors did not, however, take into account that among civilian losses, compared in magnitude with army losses, there inevitably arose a large female preponderance for the indicated ages, so that their calculations strongly underestimate losses.6

In 1991 we proposed a methodology for calculating losses in the Soviet and German armed forces and their correlation in our book, Tsena pobedy [The Price of Victory].7 In 1993 a group of authors wrote the book, Grif sekretnosti sniat [The Classification of Secrecy is Removed], which contains detailed statistical material, although without citation of sources, on Red Army losses, 1939-1945. There is not, however, a clear statement of the calculation methodology here, nor is it obvious what kind of data on losses was used as the basis for the cited figures: personal (by name) from a centralized record or current aggregates (daily, weekly, and monthly).8

Regarding Wehrmacht losses, the most reliable information, in our opinion, is contained in the work of B. Mueller-Hillerbrand. For the period 1939-44, they are based on personal (by name) reports on losses, processed by organs dealing with the German military rolls, thanks to which miscalculations and duplications in this case are reduced to a minimum. For the period from the end of 1944 until the end of the war, Mueller-Hillerbrand’s estimates are based only on admittedly incomplete reports on losses.9

Our estimates and calculation methodology in this article have undergone several changes in comparison with those contained in our book, Tsena pobedy. This is connected with the introduction of new materials into scientific circulation. We suggest that it is necessary to calculate losses using several independent methods; only upon producing numbers which are somewhat approximate for all these methods is it possible to speak about their being close to the actual magnitude of losses. We are certainly aware that a transparent analysis of primary reports on losses, in conjunction with data on personnel size, is required to establish the maximally precise figures for irreversible army (and civilian) losses. Work of this kind for the Second World War would obviously require time exceeding the period of conscious life for a single researcher; it is within the power only of a large collective, under conditions of free access to archives (a condition which is absent in modern Russia).

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