Responsibility and Freedom - The Ethical Realm of RRI by Gianni Robert;

Author:Gianni, Robert;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated
Published: 2016-02-01T16:00:00+00:00

3.3. Moral freedom

The dimension of negative freedom is, as we have already said, centered on the absence of external obstacles. The idea, however, considers as such only obstacles of an external nature, excluding from this acception any inner quality. A conception that, as we have said, was developed by thinkers like Hobbes, who were looking for a solution to “moral wars” and who therefore identified morality with religion, and religion with transcendence and, at the same time, political means of legitimization. The reflective or moral aspect could not, for obvious reasons, play any role in the realization of freedom.

Another historical parallel conception, on the other hand, emphasizes the domain of freedom as a reflective relationship between agent and action. More precisely, the hindrances are no longer identified with exterior obstacles of a material nature, but are internal to the subject as agents to exercise an autonomous reflective will. The aspect that stands out is that in order to be considered free, an agent must be able to act according to a will that is not hampered or manipulated externally, i.e. self-determined. That which defines the field of this reflective freedom therefore is no longer the absence of actions against the agent but the possibility of actions for and by the subject. The active side is the reason why Berlin demarcates this type of freedom as positive vis-à-vis the previous concept of negative freedom [BER 02].

Although we cannot consider reflective freedom as simply a development of negative freedom, a precise articulation can only be traced if we begin with the work of Rousseau and his theorization of self-determination in his books, Social Contract and Emile [ROU 68, ROU 79]. In the former, he suggests the identification of freedom with self-imposed laws while in the latter he explains how materiality alone cannot represent an external impediment if detached from the rational filter of will. In other words, we can find in Rousseau two equally valid alternatives of what freedom means. If a first one defines autonomy as the self-determination of an individual based on rational insights, a second one rather focuses on the role that reason assumes in the expression of passions intended as self-realization. We find then an ambiguous understanding of the role that reason should assume to determine the articulation of freedom [NEU 00, ROU 68, HON 14a]. Rousseau’s theorization was not that linear and paved the way to different interpretations of autonomy. In fact, to state that there is free will by which we can determine our actions, and at the same time that a subject has the power to choose either passions or reason, creates an ambiguous dichotomy that is not easy to solve [HON 14a]. The broad concept of reflective freedom, in fact, lends itself to a twofold interpretation that sees in self-determination and self-realization the two horns of the thorny question.

Beginning with Rousseau, a double current will develop the contents of freedom as reflective autonomy based on the role of desires and passions, or on that of a pure rationality.

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