Sunningdale, the Ulster Workers' Council strike and the struggle for democracy in Northern Ireland by David McCann Cillian McGrattan

Author:David McCann, Cillian McGrattan [David McCann, Cillian McGrattan]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Nonfiction, History, Ireland, Social & Cultural Studies, Political Science
ISBN: 9781526108395
Publisher: Manchester University Press
Published: 2017-03-03T05:00:00+00:00

The failure to compromise

The proceedings of the Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention underline the inability of the Unionist coalition to find a form of government which could serve as an acceptable alternative to Sunningdale. After the UWC strike, the Labour government felt that the next political initiative should press Northern Ireland politicians to engage in discussions without direction from either Great Britain or the Irish Republic. The Northern Ireland Secretary, Merlyn Rees, insisted that a political settlement could not be imposed from outside. In July 1974 a White Paper outlined a plan for the Convention, stressing that ‘the people of Northern Ireland must play a crucial part in determining their own future’. The Convention members would be asked to consider what form of government would ‘command the most widespread acceptance’ (HMSO, 1974). Little was expected from the Convention; Rees conceived of it as a process that had to be gone through and which, from the British perspective, would serve the useful purpose of emphasising that it was Northern Irish politicians who were failing to produce a workable settlement. It was also likely that more restricted terms of reference would have prevented any serious dialogue between Unionism and Nationalism occurring at all. The UUUC sought an assurance that Westminster would not impose its will on the issue of power sharing while the SDLP insisted that only power sharing was acceptable. The legislation was worded to avoid an early confrontation and restrict the Convention without explicitly imposing conditions: any proposal had to be acceptable to Westminster and Northern Irish politicians were left to harbour their own illusions as to what acceptable might mean (Aveyard, 2012).

Election results gave little incentive for the UUUC to modify its stance. It maintained overwhelming control of Northern Ireland's Westminster seats at the October 1974 general election, suffering the loss of Harry West's Fermanagh/South Tyrone seat to an independent republican but increasing its share of the vote from 51 per cent to 58 per cent. Brian Faulkner's new Unionist Party of Northern Ireland failed to win any seats, demonstrating the lack of support within the Unionist community for a compromise with constitutional Nationalism (Patterson and Kaufmann, 2007: 174–5). The UUUC's campaign for the Convention elections in May 1975 was thus based on a complete rejection of power sharing and all-Ireland institutions. The coalition's manifesto insisted on the superiority of ‘the traditional British democratic parliamentary system’. A system of all-party backbench committees was suggested to allow ‘special opportunities for any minority group’ but, it was argued, nothing should be offered that would ‘exceed or distort the mandate given by an electoral majority’. The UUUC won 46 of the 78 seats, the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (UPNI) secured a dismal five and the Alliance Party eight (HMSO, 1975). The UUUC could thus claim to have a clear mandate for the rejection of the principles behind Sunningdale.

The Convention began with plenary sessions which ran from 8 May until 3 July, adjourning for informal inter-party talks during the summer. Having secured a

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