Clash of Empires in South China: The Allied Nations' Proxy War with Japan, 1935-1941 (Modern War Studies) by Franco David Macri

Author:Franco David Macri [Macri, Franco David]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: University Press of Kansas
Published: 2015-07-04T22:00:00+00:00

Hong Kong officials were ordered to stockpile food and supplies for a protracted siege, as the colony (not just China) would now be used to influence American foreign policy in Britain’s favor. This was a significant problem; in the event of a Japanese attack, provisions would be needed for more than 2 million civilians, many of whom possessed unknown loyalties.139

Refusal of Grasett’s appeals did not prevent him from seeking greater collaboration with the Chinese, which he did on his own authority. When diplomatic tension with the Japanese was at its height over the Burma Road crisis in July, the War Office ordered Grasett not to engage in direct talks with the Chinese and thus give the Japanese reason for additional complaints. Grasett ignored this order and sent Major Charles Boxer to Chungking in August to gather intelligence on Japanese troop deployments. In October, after the departure of Governor Northcote, Grasett established a joint Sino-British radio intelligence network based in Hong Kong for the stated purpose of providing early warning of Japanese air operations from Canton airfields. In addition to Hong Kong’s air defense requirements, teams placed in Hainan and the Bocca Tigris were established to identify Japanese army and navy movements.140

Grasett informed the War Office of his actions after the fact, explaining that Chinese military personnel would be required to work in Hong Kong: “Chinese can read Japanese Naval and military air force codes, but that as their operators use unorthodox system of signals it will be necessary for Chinese operators to man Hong Kong terminals.”141 In developing this link with the Chinese army, Grasett was acting on his own, and he did not notify colonial civilian authorities. Major General E. F. Norton was serving as the officer administering the government in Northcote’s absence, and he downplayed the significance of the issue when he communicated with the War Office in November:

Arrangements made by G.O.C. designed purely to improve military intelligence naturally attempted to establish some measure of warning in war of approach of hostile aircraft. At present we can expect no warning of air raids and in view of vulnerability of Hong Kong to air attack and teeming Chinese population exposed such warning is a vital factor.

G.O.C. himself has been conducting secret conversations with the Chinese on this question and has arranged for necessary wireless sets and Chinese operators using a Chinese code to be accommodated in military premises and under military supervision. There are no administrative problems which concern the Colonial Government. On political side as arrangements made are purely of a military character, for reasons of secrecy G.O.C. has not informed the Colonial Government. They are in fact merely extension of existing intelligence system employing Chinese agents for reasons of defence and therefore have no political significance.142

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