Zoopolis by Donaldson Sue; Kymlicka Will;

Author:Donaldson, Sue; Kymlicka, Will;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2011-11-19T05:00:00+00:00

3. Positive Assistance and Intervention

As we noted earlier, one fundamental challenge facing ART concerns the question of positive obligations to wild animals. On the one hand, if we recognize animals as vulnerable selves, then surely their pain and suffering matters, even when caused by natural processes, and we should do what we can to mitigate or eliminate such suffering. This suggests, in Nussbaum’s words, that ART should aim ‘in a very general way, for the gradual supplanting of the natural by the just’ (Nussbaum 2006: 400). On the other hand, the idea that we have a duty to intervene to provide food and safe shelter to wild animals seems a reductio of the very idea of animal rights. Confronted with this dilemma, AR theorists have offered a variety of arguments in favour of the ‘laissez-faire intuition’ that we should just let wild animals be, including arguments about autonomy, flourishing, fallibility, and discretion. However, these arguments often have a rather ad hoc appearance, and do not necessarily fit together in any clear or coherent fashion.

Moreover, as soon as we think about the full range of possible interventions, the idea that we could have a single simple rule—whether an interventionist commitment to ‘supplant the natural by the just’ or a non-interventionist commitment to ‘let them be’—seems implausible. There are important variations between different types of interventions, some of which may be more permissible than others, and we need a version of ART that can capture the moral significance of these variations.

Not all human interventions in wild animal societies threaten their autonomy or habitat. Some human activity in wild animal territory might be benign—appreciation of the wilderness, or moderate resource extraction (e.g., sustainable collection of wild foods such as nuts, fruits, mushrooms, seaweeds, etc., leaving ‘enough and as good’ for others). Some interventions might actually be positively beneficial—as, for example, when selective logging increases light and air circulation in a closed forest environment in a way that enriches the ecosystem and benefits the animals living there. Although wild animals avoid human contact, they can sometimes benefit from the actions of humans, as, for example, when an individual animal is rescued after breaking through thin ice, or provided with emergency food or shelter.

Such small-scale interventions seem benign, and some large-scale interventions also seem desirable, such as the meteor deflection we mentioned earlier. We need to be very careful in justifying interventions into wild animal communities, but this does not mean that all interventions are illegitimate. Unfortunately, current versions of ART provide virtually no guidance in deciding which forms of intervention are appropriate. Can a theory of sovereignty for wild animals do better? Obviously sovereignty will not help if it is just a fancy word for ‘letting them be’. But we have argued that sovereignty is more than this: it is rooted in a distinct set of moral purposes. Sovereignty is tied to a particular set of interests (communities have legitimate interests in maintaining their social organization on their territory) and to a particular set

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