Wingate Pasha by R.J.M Pugh

Author:R.J.M Pugh [Pugh, R.J.M]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Modern, 19th Century, Military, General
ISBN: 9781473820814
Google: UYOjAwAAQBAJ
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Published: 2011-09-19T03:04:16+00:00

In point of fact, Hussein’s hand had been forced by news of Turkey’s troop movements in April, when he learnt that a force of 3,500 soldiers would pass through the Hejaz on their way to Yemen, a move he suspected was aimed at quelling any possible revolt there. In early May his son Feisal in Damascus contemplated the feasibility of a revolt when he had witnessed the execution of twenty-one Syrian nationalists by the Turkish commander there. A further message from Hussein was relayed to Wingate at Port Sudan on 27 May, explaining that he had recalled Feisal from Damascus as the Turks had gained knowledge of his plans. The Arab operations in the Hejaz – blowing up bridges, destroying rail tracks and derailing trains around Wejh (held by the Royal Navy) – were still seriously disrupting Turkish lines of communication.

Thus, in late July, following initial Arab successes in Mecca and its vicinity, the Red Sea ports of Rabegh and Yenbo fell to the Arabs, the latter chiefly achieved by the Royal Navy. However, in Medina, all was stalemate as Ali and Feisal were unable to feed and pay their men, let alone form them into a coherent fighting force. It seems that the arms, ammunition and food supplies landed at Rabegh were not being sent inland for some inexplicable reason, a fact of which Feisal complained bitterly. In addition, there was an increasing danger of counter-attack from Turkish units now being reinforced by troops from the northern provinces.

It was at this time that the British considered an operation in the Sinai desert, directed at Akaba on the Red Sea. Military thinking centred on the port of Akaba because its Turkish garrison would pose a threat to the right flank of any invading British force operating in northern Sinai. Besides, Akaba was only seventy miles from the German-built Hejaz railway link; a British presence there would be of strategic value to Hussein’s activities in the south. Lawrence had considered Akaba of strategic importance as early as the spring of 1915, although originally he rejected its capture on purely logistical grounds, a fact he later admitted after the war. On the other hand, Colonel Wilson, Wingate’s aide, had advocated a landing at Akaba in concert with Prince Feisal’s forces; however, Feisal said this could not be achieved without a British landing at Rabegh, accompanied by air cover, mountain guns, machine guns and rifles for his ill-equipped army.

A major problem was religion – as so often. The prospect of Christian troops in Muslim territory would be unwelcome in the Arab world, even if Arab leaders knew that a professional army equipped with modern weapons was essential to their own success. Also, if the Turks were to attack Mecca, they would have to pass through Rabegh, at the time poorly defended by Feisal, who did not possess the strength or ordnance to halt a determined Turkish advance. He compromised by asking for a small contingent of British troops – about 300 in all

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