Ulysses S Grant by Edward H Bonekemper III

Author:Edward H Bonekemper III [Bonekemper, Edward H III]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781596981669
Publisher: Perseus
Published: 2010-10-06T04:00:00+00:00

The answer was the same as in 1864: Lee would not move any troops from his beloved Virginia to oppose Sherman. He did, however, allow the 14,000 troops who had been defending Fort Fisher, Wilmington, and its environs to remain in North Carolina.25

Virtually unopposed, therefore, Sherman raced over the rivers and through the swamps of South Carolina to the capital at Columbia. The only delays were to rebuild burned bridges, corduroy roads, and fend off cavalry skirmishers. Columbia was burned on February 17; controversy still exists as to whether the wind-driven fire’s primary cause was Confederates’ torching of their cotton stockpiles or arson by drunken Union soldiers and other looters. Sherman’s juggernaut moved on.26

Sherman’s march on Columbia cut many of the railroad connections to Charleston and compelled the military evacuation of that “Cradle of the Confederacy” on February 15. Beauregard positioned his forces forty-five miles north of Columbia to protect Charlotte, North Carolina. Sherman, however, moved northeast toward Goldsboro and unification with Schofield and at least 21,000 soldiers who previously had entered North Carolina to capture Wilmington and were now moving inland.27

As Sherman approached and then moved into North Carolina, Jefferson Davis belatedly and reluctantly allowed Lee to reinstate Davis’s old enemy, Joseph Johnston, as commander of the remnants of the Army of Tennessee, Hardee’s corps, Hampton’s cavalry, and ultimately Bragg’s Department of North Carolina. Thus, it was not until February 22 that Lee recalled Joseph Johnston to once again serve as commander of the Army of Tennessee. Lee optimistically ordered him to “concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.”28

Johnston proposed that Lee bring a large number of his troops to North Carolina to join him in his mission to defeat Sherman. This was exactly the merger that Grant and Sherman had been so concerned about since the beginning of their simultaneous campaigns in May 1864. Sherman said, “If Lee is a soldier of genius, he will seek to transfer his army from Richmond to Raleigh or Columbia; if he is a man simply of detail, he will remain where he is, and his speedy defeat is sure.”

Hence on March 1, 1865, Johnston posed this critical question to Lee, who declined the prospect and chose instead to wait to turn on Sherman until the Federals had crossed the Roanoke River, a mere fifty-five miles south of Petersburg. At the time of Lee’s decision, Johnston had about 21,000 troops to take on Sherman’s forces: 60,000 soldiers of his own and perhaps another 30,000 with Schofield coming inland from the North Carolina coast. As it turned out, each Confederate army would lose separately.29

From March 8 to 10, Bragg’s 8,500 troops halted Schofield’s westward movement at Kinston, North Carolina. The delay was temporary only because Sherman’s overwhelming force was moving farther northeast with little hindrance. He took Fayetteville on March 11, crossed the Cape Fear and Black rivers, and continued northeast toward a rendezvous with Schofield at Goldsboro. Grant earlier had selected Goldsboro as Sherman’s goal because it was the junction of

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