Feminists Read Habermas Gendering the Subject of Discourse by M. Johanna Meehan

Author:M. Johanna Meehan
Language: eng
Format: mobi, epub
Tags: feminism, habermas, critical theory, LGBTQ2S+ Philosophy, media studies, philosophy

Communicative Rationality, Autonomy, and Community

Habermas uses the concept of consensus to articulate an ideal of socialization and enculturation, an ideal of the just society, and an epistemological theory of justified belief. For Habermas, the coincidence of these various functions in one particular type of social relationship—a rationally grounded consensus—is no accident. Defining the ideal consensus as one in which no point of view is excluded or arbitrarily discounted, Habermas argues that the confidence that one has in being freely and openly convinced of the best argument is also the basis of genuine social mutuality and trust, as well as that of democratic and just institutions.

The ideal of consensus also holds sway in much of feminist practice. The consensual method of feminist practice shares with Habermas’s ideal consensus the interest in overcoming relationships of dominance and submission, in sharing power, and opening discussion to all perspectives. However, the feminist practice of consensus, unlike Habermas’s ideal discourse, only occasionally takes the ratified form of theoretical-scientific or ethical-judicial discourse (the two forms of universal consensus-oriented discourse). Normally, except perhaps in the academy, the feminist effort to arrive at

From Communicative Rationality to Communicative Thinking I 143 consensus is meant to elicit more individual truths and needs, in order to shape and consolidate consensual support for substantive practical and political goals. This does not entail a rejection of the ideal of universal truth in relation to scientific claims or issues of justice. Nor does it entail that feminists have no stake in how claims about scientific truth and universal principles of justice are adjudicated. It simply means that procedures for testing scientific theories or the formal virtues of a principle of justice do not figure centrally in reaching consensus on practices and goals that feminists consider. But if Habermas’s consensual procedure is designed for purposes that might really be peripheral to feminist ends, then how pertinent can it be to our conception of feminist communication, thinking and analysis? And if feminist thought is not principally scientific-theoretical, or ethical-judicial in Habermas’s sense, then what is it? Bearing these questions in mind, let us examine his vision of communicative rationality.

Habermas’s interest in overcoming domination is expressed in his requirement that a consensus is valid only insofar as each individual participant is “motivated,” by consideration of the full range of observations, interpretations, analyses, counter-examples, and replies offered to accept the “forceless force of the better argument.” Thus, rational consensus is based not on the power or charisma of individuals, but upon the most cogent position. The cogency of a position, in turn, is decided on the grounds of the strength and consistency of the inductive relation between observation and theory, and ideally, because there are no further possible reasons for conflict with the consensual position. Because acceptance of a consensual position is based only on this activity of collective hypothesis generating, testing, and accepting or rejecting (without any coercive or otherwise undue pressure from anyone), each participant is fully autonomous, while at the same time maximally respectful of the other participants in dialogue.

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