Fellow Creatures by Korsgaard Christine M.;

Author:Korsgaard, Christine M.;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA - OSO
Published: 2018-03-29T16:00:00+00:00

7.4.2 That argument is controversial, but for our purposes here the trouble is that even if it works, it is not decisive. Laws are by their very nature universal, according to Kant, and a universal law can extend its protection to someone who did not participate, and could not have participated, in its legislation. So there are actually two senses in which you can “owe a duty to someone”: you can owe a duty to someone in the sense that he is the recognized authority who made the law for you, or you can owe a duty to someone in the sense that the law by its content gives him a right, which enables him to make a claim on you. Moral laws, as we have seen, give us duties to each other in the first sense, although in a distinctively democratic version of that sense. Since we are autonomous, others do not exactly have authority over us, but Kant thinks we have reciprocal authority over each other. But we could still owe things to the animals in the other sense of “owe a duty to someone”: they could be covered by the content of our laws.

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