China's Asymmetric Statecraft by Yuxing Huang

China's Asymmetric Statecraft by Yuxing Huang

Author:Yuxing Huang
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: University of British Columbia Press
Published: 2023-06-15T00:00:00+00:00


why is the US approaching us so desperately? … In Southeast Asia, the US position is getting more difficult every day, particularly with respect to its troop withdrawal from Indochina. In the past, they turned to Soviet revisionists for help. In view of the current situation, [however,] it is impossible to solve problems without Chinese participation. They need us on this matter. This could be the first issue under discussion when they come to negotiate with us.139

Therefore, China needed to consider how to accommodate its Indochinese allies while trying to promote a strategic relationship with the United States. During Sino-American secret negotiations in July 1971, it adopted uniform strategies toward the DRV and Cambodia. To retain US credibility in the eyes of American allies, Kissinger stressed continued support to Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam and Lon Nol of Cambodia. He also denounced the DRV’s military presence in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Zhou, on the other hand, was committed to regime change in South Vietnam and Cambodia and conducted an oral defence of the DRV.140 “So long as the war does not cease, we will continue our support. This support is not only for the people of Vietnam, but also the people of Cambodia and Laos.”141 Despite these facts, the change in Sino-American relations made the DRV and Sihanouk skeptical about future Chinese support. On July 16, Beijing announced its invitation to President Nixon to visit China. In response, Hanoi publicly claimed through its official editorial that Washington would “try to achieve a compromise between big powers in an attempt to make smaller countries bow to their agreements.”142 The editorial implicitly but clearly criticized the Chinese “agreement” with the United States concerning the DRV. In private talks, Le Duan was more specific. He was most concerned “about the recent diminishing of worldwide interest in the Vietnam War, resulting from the President [Nixon]’s impending trip to Beijing. He stated that [this] was the most important present problem in continuing the war” and emphasized that “there were a number of critical things he would like to say about the USSR and China, especially the latter, but he felt compelled to remain silent to avoid jeopardizing continued Soviet and Chinese aid without which North Vietnam could not continue to fight.”143 For his part, Sihanouk directly expressed to Chinese leaders his anger over the Sino-American rapprochement: “The US is the Number One imperialist country. It wages aggressive [wars] everywhere! … Why would China receive the president of such a country! What are you going to talk to him about?”144 During Nixon’s visit to China, Sihanouk paid a visit to Hanoi and published tough words there.

In view of these grievances, therefore, there was a real possibility that the DRV and Sihanouk might tilt toward the Soviet Union. In response, China avoided any selective strategies toward the allies. As Zhou argued privately, “for the present, it is not appropriate to overpraise Vietnam; we should treat her as we do the other two nations [Cambodia and Laos].”145



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