Battle of the Atlantic by Donald Macintyre

Author:Donald Macintyre
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781783379705
Publisher: Pen and Sword

A vexing problem for the Allied high command was whether their burgeoning Atlantic operations would be more efficiently conducted if made a unified command. While wasteful duplication could obviously be thus avoided, the issue decided itself because none of the Allies could countenance the delegation to others of the responsibility for their strategic waters. Admiral King was also adamant that US naval forces would not serve under British direction, and assumed that, with the United States now the dominant partner, the appointment of an American supreme commander was axiomatic. Although the Admiralty Board professed itself broadly in favour of a ‘step-by-step’ approach to deeper integration, the First Sea Lord, the very able Sir Dudley Pound, stood firmly against it.

While small improvements were continuously made, therefore, the proposed overall aim was not pursued. In Churchill's words, matters were best left to ‘separate commands working in close cooperation and unison on either side of the Atlantic’.

In making major commitments at Casablanca the leaders paid but scant attention to that Cinderella issue, the availability of shipping. The British Minister of War Transport and very experienced shipping man, Lord Leathers, attended the conference as technical adviser but his opinions, vital to the formulation of policy, were of but ancillary interest. Neither the American nor British Chiefs of Staff considered the Ministry to be concerned with military questions yet, even as they drew up their plans and timetables, that same Ministry could have told them that, in their fulfilment, shipping would need to be in more than one place at the same time.

Operations to date had been on a modest scale and tolerably close to home. After Casablanca, objectives included re-opening the Burma Road (Operation Anakim), to shipping over a further 1 million American troops (Operation Bolero), shipments to Free French forces in Africa and more to Soviet Russia via the Persian Gulf. In addition, Admiral King was pressing to increase the tempo against Japan in the Pacific.

In support of these far-flung objectives leaders of both sides seemed beguiled by the pending flood of American-built standard tonnage. Pending, however, remained the operative word for, as we have seen, 1942 had seen a net reduction of 1.3 million GRT in Allied-controlled shipping.

Crucial to the whole war effort was keeping Britain supplied with at least the minimum level of essential imports. Yet Anakim alone, it was calculated, would cost the United Kingdom the equivalent of 0.5 million imported tons during the first half of 1943. Leathers put it later to the Chiefs of Staff: ‘We must cut the cost of our strategy according to the cloth of our shipping.’ Enormous concerns remained with the British, Churchill being advised that ‘It is impossible to plan ahead as long as we are at the mercy of the day-to-day moods [of the Americans] and can only extract last-minute promises, wrapped up in provisos [and] only covering a few months at a time.’

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